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1725 
DANGER AHEAD: RISK ASSESSMENT AND THE 
FUTURE OF BAIL REFORM 
John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson* 
Abstract: In the last five years, legislators in all fifty states have made changes to their 
pretrial justice systems. Reform efforts aim to shrink jails by incarcerating fewer people—
particularly poor, low-risk defendants and racial minorities. Many jurisdictions are 
embracing pretrial risk assessment instruments—statistical tools that use historical data to 
forecast which defendants can safely be released—as a centerpiece of reform. Now, many are 
questioning the extent to which pretrial risk assessment instruments actually serve reform 
goals. Existing scholarship and debate centers on how the instruments themselves may 
reinforce racial disparities and on how their opaque algorithms may frustrate due process 
interests. 
This Article highlights three underlying challenges that have yet to receive the attention 
they require. First, today’s risk assessment tools lead to what we term “zombie predictions.” 
That is, predictive models trained on data from older bail regimes are blind to the risk-
reducing benefits of recent bail reforms. This may cause predictions that systematically 
overestimate risk. Second, “decision-making frameworks” that mediate the court system’s 
use of risk estimates embody crucial moral judgments, yet currently escape appropriate 
public scrutiny. Third, in the long-term, these tools risk giving an imprimatur of scientific 
objectivity to ill-defined concepts of “dangerousness,” may entrench the Supreme Court’s 
historically recent blessing of preventive detention for dangerousness, and could pave the 
way for an increase in preventive detention. 
Pretrial risk assessment instruments, as they are currently built and used, cannot safely be 
assumed to support reformist goals of reducing incarceration and addressing racial and 
poverty-based inequities. This Article contends that system stakeholders who share those 
goals are best off focusing their reformist energies on other steps that can more directly 
promote decarceral changes and greater equity in pretrial justice. Where pretrial risk 
assessments remain in use, this Article proposes two vital steps that should be seen as 
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minimally necessary to address the challenges surfaced. First, where they choose to embrace 
risk assessment, jurisdictions must carefully define what they wish to predict, gather and use 
local, recent data, and continuously update and calibrate any model on which they choose to 
rely, investing in a robust data infrastructure where necessary to meet these goals. Second, 
instruments and frameworks must be subject to strong, inclusive governance. 
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INTRODUCTION  
A. The Story of Springfield 
Springfield County1 has an open secret: It keeps many low-income 
people in jail who could safely be released. Most of these people are 
people of color. Two years ago, policymakers in Springfield joined a 
national trend, and approved a suite of reforms that they hoped would 
dramatically reduce the jail population. Their goal was to shrink the jail 
by detaining only those few defendants who were too risky to safely 
release pending trial, while sparing most of the large, low-income 
accused population from the life-altering consequences of even a short 
jail stay. 
As a central focus of its reforms, Springfield adopted a popular 
“pretrial risk assessment tool”—a statistical tool that uses historical data 
to forecast and advise judges which defendants can be safely released at 
arraignment.2 County leaders and local advocates believed that the tool 
itself, by providing objective information about the low risk posed by 
most defendants, would lead judges to release more defendants, reduce 
existing racial disparities in the pretrial jail population, and reduce 
rearrests and missed court dates among those released. 
Buoyed partly by their optimism about the new digital tool, 
policymakers also approved several other changes that strengthened 
alternatives to pretrial incarceration, including drug counseling, text 
message reminders of upcoming court dates, and ankle-worn GPS 
monitors that could be mandated in lieu of incarceration. Two years after 
reform was introduced, the situation remains disappointing. 
Springfield’s average pretrial jail population has declined slightly, but 
the sweeping change supporters first imagined has not arrived. 
Moreover, the number of defendants remanded to custody with no offer 
of bail actually increased. And the number of individuals with non-
financial conditions of release, especially GPS monitoring, has 
                                                     
1. An imaginary—but otherwise typical—U.S. jurisdiction. 
2. How pretrial risk assessment tools are developed and work in practice is detailed in 
section III.A. 
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skyrocketed. Rearrest rates remain the same, while failure to appear rates 
have risen slightly. And judges reject the risk assessment tool’s 
recommendations in nearly half of cases—nearly always in a more 
punitive direction relative to what the tool recommended.3 
In the wake of what was supposed to be landmark reform, local 
leaders are left asking: What happened? Several answers are apparent. 
First, Springfield’s pretrial risk assessment tool has a numbers problem. 
The tool’s predictions are based on historic patterns in the combined 
data of many other jurisdictions—places that often had higher crime 
rates than Springfield and that offered little-to-nothing in the way of 
pretrial services during the periods when the data was generated. The 
tool’s predictions are neither tailored to Springfield nor updated to 
reflect the impact of Springfield’s latest reforms. Taken together, these 
discrepancies have the perverse effect of not only making the accused in 
Springfield appear more likely to be rearrested or fail to appear to court 
than they truly are, but also of continuing patterns of unneeded jailing 
and encouraging overuse of restrictive conditions, like new GPS 
monitors. 
 Second, there is a moral question at the heart of every risk 
assessment tool—namely, how to balance various risks with the liberty 
and due process interests of the accused—and Springfield’s leaders 
largely ignored that question. The “decision-making framework,” which 
converts raw risk assessment scores into proposed conditions of release, 
was treated as an afterthought, and in the end, the framework 
recommended far more defendants for burdensome conditions or 
detention than the reform’s architects anticipated. As a result, the new 
tool’s recommendations, even if strictly adhered to by judges, would not 
have done much to help Springfield achieve its stated goal of 
decarceration. 
Third, the pretrial risk assessment tool was opaque, with vital 
information unavailable. Defendants, lawyers, and judges are not able to 
understand what factors led an individual to be forecast as a high risk of 
rearrest, nor could they learn precisely what data had been used, and in 
what way, to create the tool. Even if they had wanted to, Springfield 
officials would not have been able to update the system’s underlying 
model with new pretrial release data. 
                                                     
3. Throughout the Article, we use the term “judges” for the actors responsible for making pretrial 
decisions. Across the country, this title varies. We use “judge” for simplicity’s sake.  
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B. Bail, Reform, and Risk Assessment 
The parable of Springfield is fictional but holds important lessons. 
For nearly a century, scholars have charted how the American system of 
money bail needlessly jails low-income defendants, often derailing their 
lives, simply because they cannot afford to pay for release.4 Today, 
recognizing this problem, legislators and courts in many jurisdictions are 
exploring a wide range of reforms that replace or cabin money bail, 
aiming to provide reasonable assurance of the defendant’s reappearance 
at trial and the protection of public safety without financial conditions. 
Reform steps are varied, and include drug diversion programs, GPS 
monitoring of people who are released, and pretrial services, such as 
reminding defendants of upcoming court dates.5 
One popular reform, addressed in at least twenty laws in fourteen 
states since 2012, is the introduction of statistical risk assessment tools.6 
Such tools use historical data to describe how often defendants similar to 
the current one failed to appear for a court date, or were rearrested 
pending resolution of their cases. Until recently, risk assessments were 
widely portrayed as progressive tools that will help shrink jails by 
releasing indigent, low-risk defendants who could not afford to pay 
money bail. Last year, the National Association of Counties even called 
on local officials to adopt risk assessment tools, and a cohort of 
prominent public defense and criminal defense groups called for “the use 
of validated pretrial risk assessment in all jurisdictions, as a necessary 
                                                     
4. See generally ARTHUR BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO 160 (1927) (documenting the 
inequities of the bail system, and also finding that “[t]he present system . . . neither guarantees 
security to society nor safeguards the rights of the accused”). 
5. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TRENDS IN PRETRIAL RELEASE: STATE 
LEGISLATION 1–2 (2018) [hereinafter TRENDS IN PRETRIAL RELEASE 2018], 
http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/ImageLibrary/WebImages/Criminal%20Justice/pretrialEnactments_2
017_v03.pdf [https://perma.cc/CUQ5-V7ZP].  
6. AMBER WIDGERY, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES. TRENDS IN PRETRIAL 
RELEASE: STATE LEGISLATION 1 (2015) [hereinafter TRENDS IN PRETRIAL RELEASE 2015], 
http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/ImageLibrary/WebImages/Criminal%20Justice/NCSL%20pretrialTre
nds_v05.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2YD-QW5W] (noting that “[f]rom 2012 to 2014, 261 new laws in 
47 states addressed pretrial policy,” to show that the pace of legislation related to pretrial policy is 
also rapid). From 2012 to 2017, every state enacted a new pretrial policy—there were 500 new 
enactments, with 122 new enactments alone in forty-two states in 2015. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, TRENDS IN PRETRIAL RELEASE: STATE LEGISLATION UPDATE 1–2 (2017) 
[hereinafter TRENDS IN PRETRIAL RELEASE 2017], https://comm.ncsl.org/productfiles/98120201 
/NCSL-Pretrial-Trends-Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/HAN8-QX6N]. 
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component of a fair pretrial release system.”7 This Article offers a 
different view. 
Part I describes how America’s approach to money bail arose, the 
injustices that American bail practices have always entailed, and the 
challenges and reversals earlier reform efforts faced. Part II describes 
today’s reform efforts, which are motivated by the enormous human and 
social costs that current bail regimes impose on the accused, their 
families, and their communities. 
Part III explains the current practice of pretrial risk assessment and 
describes three underlying challenges that have yet to receive the 
attention they require. First, today’s risk assessment tools will likely lead 
to what we term “zombie predictions,” where old data, reflecting 
outdated bail practices, is newly reanimated through statistical prediction 
that is blind to the benefits of local or recent reforms. Jurisdictions often 
do not measure the changing landscape of actual risks their defendants 
face, let alone update their forecasts of risk to reflect that changing 
landscape. This Article argues that these issues lead many instruments to 
systematically overestimate risk, and it reviews early empirical evidence 
that suggests overestimation may already be occurring. Second, the 
“decision-making frameworks” that mediate the court system’s 
understanding and use of risk estimates embody crucial moral judgments 
and shape the impact of risk assessment tools on incarceration levels, yet 
currently escape broad public input and scrutiny. Harsh frameworks may 
undercut the apparent impact of other pretrial reforms, particularly when 
combined with exaggerated estimates of risk. Third, the embrace of 
pretrial risk assessment instruments exposes longer-term doctrinal and 
policy risks for advocates of bail reform. Specifically, these new tools 
risk giving an imprimatur of scientific objectivity to ill-defined concepts 
of “dangerousness,” and may entrench the Supreme Court’s recent 
blessing of preventive detention for dangerousness—which, in turn, 
could pave the way for a possible increase in preventive detention. 
Part IV proposes two vital steps that are minimally necessary to 
address these core challenges. First, where they choose to embrace risk 
assessment, jurisdictions must rely on local, recent data; continuously 
update and calibrate any model on which they choose to rely; and 
carefully define what it is they wish to predict. Notably, these steps 
require resources: many jurisdictions will need to make new investments 
                                                     
7. GIDEON’S PROMISE ET AL., JOINT STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE USE OF PRETRIAL RISK 
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS 4 (2017) (emphasis added), 
https://www.publicdefenders.us/files/Defenders%20Statement%20on%20Pretrial%20RAI%20May
%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FE5-NA7R]. 
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to create a robust data infrastructure in order to become capable of 
wielding prediction responsibly. Second, where such instruments are 
used at all, the instruments and frameworks must be subject to strong, 
inclusive governance. Such governance should mean at least that the 
tools themselves never recommend detention, that the risk assessments 
and frameworks are public, and that the communities most impacted by 
mass incarceration are directly involved in shaping the tools and 
frameworks. 
Part V concludes that pretrial risk assessment instruments, as 
currently used and implemented, cannot safely be assumed to advance 
reformist goals of reducing incarceration and enhancing the bail 
system’s fairness. Early evidence remains sparse, and risk assessment 
instruments may yet prove themselves effective tools in the arsenal of 
bail reform. But, to date, they have not done so. Without careful design 
and open governance, this Article finds that it is more likely than not that 
these tools will perpetuate or worsen the very problems reform 
advocates hope to solve. 
The United States has used money bail for more than a century, and 
reformers have been working for nearly as long to address its ills.8 Now 
that risk assessment tools are becoming a widespread part of the pretrial 
landscape, basic justice and equity require a clear-eyed view of these 
tools, their limits, and how those limits can be addressed. This Article 
aims to contribute to that effort. 
I.  AMERICA’S CONTESTED APPROACH TO BAIL 
A bail hearing has always involved a prediction, but what is being 
predicted has changed. Historically, the goal of a bail hearing was to 
ensure a defendant’s appearance for trial, and the question was what it 
would take to ensure the defendant’s reappearance in court.9 Bail 
hearings have since evolved to incorporate (and in many cases to center 
on) predictions of a criminal defendant’s dangerousness—that is, the risk 
that he or she will commit future crimes if released.10 
The story of this turn toward dangerousness begins, improbably, with 
the civil rights movement and what commentators often call the “first 
                                                     
8. See infra Part II (detailing the history of bail and bail reform in the United States).  
9. Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OH. ST. L.J. 723, 731–34 (2011). 
10. John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2, 15–16 (1985).  
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formal generation” of bail reform.11 These reforms focused on 
eliminating inappropriate uses of pretrial detention, especially among 
poor defendants.12 The story ends after a second wave of bail changes, 
during which the Supreme Court ultimately held that the Eighth 
Amendment provides individuals with no absolute right to bail.13 
The pendulum of policy change swung first toward more liberal 
release policies as a part of the civil rights movement, then reversed as 
conservatives in the Nixon and Reagan years reengineered pretrial 
practice toward a “law and order” approach.14 Ultimately, this history 
suggests that risk assessment tools cannot safely be presumed to be 
instruments of decarceration, notwithstanding the widespread public 
hope that they will play that role.15 
                                                     
11. Timothy Schnacke, The Third Generation of Bail Reform, in NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE 
COURTS, TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 8, 9 (Deborah W. Smith, Charles F. Campbell & Blake P. 
Kavanagh eds., 2017), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/Trends%202017/Trends-
2017-Final-small.ashx [https://perma.cc/8T74-P4B5].  
12. See TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, MICHAEL R. JONES & CLAIRE M.B. BOOKER, PRETRIAL JUSTICE 
INST., THE HISTORY OF BAIL AND PRETRIAL RELEASE 10–12 (2010), 
https://b.3cdn.net/crjustice/2b990da76de40361b6_rzm6ii4zp.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9XW-NM3P]. 
13. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
14. ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF 
MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 134, 139 (2016) (emphasis added). Our understanding and 
framing is indebted to the work of historians and scholars who have critically examined the role of 
the Johnson Administration in, paradoxically, helping pave the way for the massive changes under 
the Nixon and Reagan administrations. See, e.g., id. at 14 (“By expanding the federal government’s 
power in the pursuit of twinned social welfare and social control goals, Johnson paradoxically paved 
the way for the anticrime policies of the Nixon and Ford administrations to be turned against his 
own antipoverty programs. Nixon merely appropriated the regressive aspects of the Johnson 
administration as his own . . . .”); see also Elizabeth Hinton, “A War Within Our Own Boundaries”: 
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society and the Rise of the Carceral State, 102 J. AM. HIST. 100, 102 
(2015) (“Far from being ambivalent about crime control as a major aim of domestic policy, Johnson 
and his radical domestic programs laid the foundation of the carceral state, opening an entirely new 
plane of domestic social programs centered on crime control, surveillance, and incarceration.”). 
15. This observation, of course, is not new. Writing in 1992, Malcolm M. Feeley and Jonathan 
Simon detailed what they termed the “new penology,” which replaced “a moral or clinical 
description of the individual with an actuarial language of probabilistic calculations and statistical 
distributions applied to populations.” Malcom M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: 
Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 452, 
455 (1992). In their view, “[t]he new penology is neither about punishing nor about rehabilitating 
individuals. It is about identifying and managing unruly groups. It is concerned with the rationality 
not of individual behavior or even community organization, but of managerial processes. Its goal is 
not to eliminate crime but to make it tolerable through systemic coordination.” Id. See also Eric 
Silver & Lisa L. Miller, A Cautionary Note on the Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment Tools for 
Social Control, 48 CRIM. & DELINQ. 138, 157 (2002) (arguing that “[i]nsufficient attention has been 
paid to the negative potential embodied in actuarial social control technologies that, in the name of 
science and safety, increasingly conceptualize the individual in terms of population 
aggregates . . . [and] the activities that must follow once risk is assessed”). 
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A. The Origins of American Bail 
Historically, American criminal defendants were generally presumed 
to have a right to bail—the right either to be released outright until their 
trial, or else to obtain release subject to some judicially imposed (usually 
financial) condition.16 The exceptions to this general rule were capital 
cases, where the threat of execution was presumed likely to impel a 
defendant to flee the jurisdiction if released.17 In early American history, 
such release conditions typically took the form of a third-party 
“pledge”—someone known to the court who would be financially liable 
if the defendant failed to appear when required.18 “Bail historically 
served the sole purpose of returning the defendant to court for trial, not 
preventing her from committing additional crimes.”19 
Between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
commercial bond industry superseded the personal surety system.20 
Despite that watershed revolution, a bail hearing’s predictive goal 
remained the same: ensuring a defendant’s appearance. For example, in 
                                                     
16. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *296 (explaining that the accused must 
“put in securities for his appearance, to answer the charge against him”); TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, 
NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR 
PRETRIAL PRACTITIONERS AND A FRAMEWORK FOR AMERICAN PRETRIAL REFORM (2014). 
17. This exception was longstanding. As William Blackstone wrote, “[f]or what is it that a man 
may not be induced to forfeit to save his own life?” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*297. Notably, a substantial number of crimes in the eighteenth century were capital offenses. See, 
e.g., John N. Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. REV. 
1223, 1227 (1969) (noting that “at that time the great majority of criminal offenses involving a 
threat of serious physical injury or death were punishable by death under state laws”). 
18. SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL IN 
AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 164 (2018). 
19. Baradaran, supra note 9, 731. 
20. First, the personal surety system of the early United States depended upon the sufficient 
availability of community members able to serve as sureties. But the pace at which the United States 
grew diluted the important community ties that made the personal surety click. Compounding this 
problem was a seemingly ever-expanding western frontier, which only appeared to increase an 
individual’s likelihood of flight. Peggy M. Tobolowsky & James F. Quinn, Pretrial Release in the 
1990s: Texas Takes Another Look at Nonfinancial Release Conditions, 19 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & 
CIV. CONFINEMENT 267, 274 n.38 (1993). Second, changes in court practice contributed to the 
demise of the personal surety system and “courts began eroding historic rules against profiting from 
bail and indemnifying sureties, slowly ushering in the commercial bail bonding business at the end 
of the century.” TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MONEY AS 
A CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAKEHOLDER: THE JUDGE’S DECISION TO RELEASE OR DETAIN A 
DEFENDANT PRETRIAL 26 (2014) [hereinafter MONEY AS A STAKEHOLDER]. These changes led 
states to experiment with new ways of ensuring a defendant’s appearance and administering bail, all 
of which “combined to give birth to . . . the commercial money bail bond industry.” SCHNACKE ET 
AL., supra note 12, at 6. 
08 - Koepke & Robinson (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 12/28/2018  4:27 PM 
1734 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1725 
 
Stack v. Boyle,21 the Supreme Court detailed how the commercial bail 
bond industry complemented the longstanding purpose of bail: 
The right to release before trial is conditioned upon the 
accused’s giving adequate assurance that he will stand 
trial . . . . Like the ancient practice of securing the oaths of 
responsible persons to stand as sureties for the accused, the 
modern practice of requiring a bail bond or the deposit of a sum 
of money subject to forfeiture serves as additional assurance of 
the presence of an accused.22 
A bail hearing’s officially narrow focus on ensuring a defendant 
would reappear at trial, however, was never the whole story. 
Unofficially, a defendant’s predicted dangerousness has always mattered 
to some degree, and it “was widely acknowledged that judges 
deliberately set unaffordable bail amounts on pretextual flight risk 
grounds so that dangerous individuals would be detained until trial.”23 
By setting unattainable bail amounts—a practice known as sub rosa 
preventive detention—judges were able to prevent defendants they 
believed to be dangerous from getting out of jail.24 
Despite a recognition that judges sometimes did look to 
considerations other than flight risk in setting bail, the propriety of 
looking beyond flight risk was hotly contested. At the National 
Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice in 1964, the issue of preventive 
detention on account of a defendant’s perceived dangerousness was 
described as “[p]erhaps the most perplexing of all problems.”25 Some 
argued that the “jailing of persons by courts because of anticipated, but 
uncommitted crimes, is a concept wholly at war with the basic traditions 
of American justice.”26 Others argued that the “possibility of preventive 
detention should be a matter of discretion in cases where the welfare and 
safety of the public is in peril.”27 The debate would run for more than a 
decade and, in the end, transform bail. 
                                                     
21. 342 U.S. 1 (1951). 
22. Id. at 4–5 (emphasis added). 
23. Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 BYU L. REV. 837, 
848 (2016).  
24. Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 503 (2018).  
25. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & THE VERA FOUND., PROCEEDINGS AND INTERIM REPORT OF 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE xxix (1965), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Photocopy/355NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/XN24-GQ4W]. 
26. Id. at 170. 
27. Id. at 165.  
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B. The Civil Rights Era: Fighting to End Poverty Jailing 
The early 1960s bail reform effort was tied to the larger movement for 
civil rights. It focused on the plight of poor defendants in crowded 
jails.28 The commercial bail bond industry promised to assist defendants 
in financial distress. In reality, however, it helped create that distress, 
mostly by supporting widespread financial conditions and then charging 
steep up-front fees and collateral for their services.29 Civil-rights era 
reformers built their advocacy, in part, on empirical work that 
established two key findings: that jails were overcrowded with 
defendants who could not meet financial conditions of release,30 and that 
defendants with community ties could, in fact, be released safely—even 
when they could not afford to pay bail.31 
These findings were not necessarily new. As early as 1927, a seminal 
report on Chicago’s bail system detailed how poor defendants 
languished in pretrial detention solely because they could not pay small 
bail amounts.32 Similarly, a 1954 study of bail in Philadelphia found that 
the “practical effect of Philadelphia[’s] methods for determining the 
amount of bail is to deny bail to . . . a substantial proportion of those 
charged with lesser crimes [and also] explain the chronic overcrowding 
in the untried department of the County Prison.”33 Concern over New 
York’s money bail system led the Vera Institute of Justice to design and 
implement the 1961 Manhattan Bail Project, which demonstrated that 
defendants with strong community ties could be released on their own 
recognizance without increasing rates of failure to appear.34 Even if they 
                                                     
28. Goldkamp, supra note 10, at 2; see also Jeffrey Fagan & Martin Guggenheim, Preventive 
Detention and the Judicial Prediction of Dangerousness for Juveniles: A Natural Experiment, 86 J. 
CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 417 (“The first reforms, in the 1960s, were aimed principally at 
eliminating the unregulated use of pretrial detention, primarily among poor defendants in urban 
jails. Reformers were critical of the conditions of confinement in American jails, the discriminatory 
setting of unaffordable bail for the urban poor and the indirect use of punitive detention.”). 
29. MONEY AS A STAKEHOLDER, supra note 20, at 31.  
30. Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 
1031 (1954) [hereinafter Administration of Bail in Philadelphia]. 
31. See EVIE LOTZE ET AL., PRETRIAL SERVS. RES. CTR., THE PRETRIAL SERVICES REFERENCE 
BOOK 9 (1999), https://pretrial.harriscountytx.gov/Library1/The%20Pretrial%20Services%20 
Reference%20Book.pdf [https://perma.cc/D346-R7NU]. The Manhattan Bail Project found that, 
after three years of operation, 65% of interviewees/arrestees could be safely released pretrial with 
only 1% of them failing to appear for trial. Id. 
32. ARTHUR BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO (1927). 
33. Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, supra note 30, at 1048–49.  
34. SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 12, at 10 (“The project generated national interest in bail 
reform, and within two years programs modeled after the Manhattan Bail Project were launched in 
St. Louis, Chicago, Tulsa, Washington D.C., Des Moines, and Los Angeles.”). 
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were not necessarily revelatory, these findings spurred reform efforts 
that sought to minimize cash bail and increase the use of release 
alternatives. 
In 1966 Congress responded by nearly unanimously passing the Bail 
Reform Act to “assure that all persons, regardless of their financial 
status, shall not needlessly be detained” pretrial.35 The Bail Reform Act 
of 1966 sought to promote release on recognizance, and minimize 
reliance on money bail. It established that a defendant’s financial status 
should not be a reason for denying their pretrial release,36 made clear 
that the risk of nonappearance at trial should be the only criterion 
considered when bail is assessed,37 and mandated that non-capital 
defendants be released with the least restrictive set of conditions that 
would ensure their appearance at trial.38 The Act also generally forbade 
judges from treating a defendant’s dangerousness or risk to public safety 
as a reason for detention.39 
There were, however, three key exceptions to that rule: capital cases, 
cases where convicted defendants awaited sentencing, and cases where 
convicted defendants filed an appeal.40 These exceptions represented the 
                                                     
35. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3146-3151 (2018)). 
36. Id. § 2 (“The purpose of this Act is to revise the practices relating to bail to assure that all 
persons, regardless of their financial status, shall not needlessly be detained pending their 
appearance . . . .”). 
37. In making the determination that an individual would be likely to appear in court, the Act 
allowed judges to consider a wide range of factors, including the defendant’s “family ties, 
employment, financial resources, character and mental condition, the length of his residence in the 
community, his record of convictions, and his record of appearance at court proceedings or of flight 
to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court.” 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b). 
38. Id. § 3146(a). 
39. In United States v. Leathers, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the structure of the 
1966 Act and “its legislative history make it clear that in noncapital cases pretrial detention cannot 
be premised upon an assessment of danger to the public.” 412 F.2d 169, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1969). That 
is because “only limited consideration was given to the protection of society from crimes which 
might be perpetrated by persons released under the Act; in fact, Congress specifically postponed 
consideration of those issues relating to crimes committed by persons released pending trial.” 
Warren L. Miller, The Bail Reform Act of 1966: Need for Reform in 1969, 19 CATH. U. L. REV. 24, 
32 (1969). Nevertheless, some of the legislative history indicates a belief that detaining a defendant 
because of “predicted—but as yet unconsummated—offense” was illegal. Federal Bail Procedures: 
Hearing on S. 1357 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights and the Subcomm. on 
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 3 (1965) 
(statement of Sen. Ervin, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights). 
40. In the section of the Act that governed “release in capital cases or after conviction,” judges 
were expressly authorized to consider “danger to any other person or to the community” as a proper 
element in setting bail in such cases. Pub. L. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214, 216. Thus, a person accused of a 
capital offense and those who had been convicted of any offense and were appealing that conviction 
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first time in American history that a law authorized a judge to consider 
dangerousness as a legitimate reason to deny bail.41 By allowing 
consideration of future dangerousness for a limited set of defendants, the 
Act opened a new door. If judges could consider future dangerousness 
for capital defendants, why not for other defendants, too? Were the 
circumstances so different?42 By allowing judges to consider future 
dangerousness for one set of defendants, the new law legitimated the 
project of judicial predictions of dangerousness.43 
C. The 1970s and 1980s: Reversing Course to Address 
“Dangerousness” 
Shortly after these reforms arrived, the political consensus shifted 
decisively in the opposite direction.44 Rising crime rates fed a perception 
that earlier efforts had focused too much on the welfare of the accused, 
and not enough on the welfare of the public.45 Commentators observed 
                                                     
or were awaiting sentencing could have their “danger to any other person or to the community” 
considered at a bail hearing. Id. 
41. Matthew J. Hegreness, America’s Fundamental and Vanishing Right to Bail, 55 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 909, 958 (2013). 
42. For an even more foundational examination of this line of questioning, see Mayson, supra 
note 24, at 497 (“One way to start thinking about what level of risk justifies restraint is to ask a 
related question: is the answer different for defendants than for people not accused of any crime?”). 
43. John B. Howard, The Trial of Pretrial Dangerousness: Preventive Detention after United 
States v. Salerno, 75 VA. L. REV. 639, 645 (1989) (“Although some argued that the exception 
simply recognized the unique temptation of the capital defendant to flee, others justified the 
exception by pointing to the dangers to the community of releasing a capital defendant. This latter 
argument, coupled with the view that bail is a statutory and not a constitutional right, formed the 
foundation of the argument in favor of the constitutionality of preventive pretrial detention.” 
(emphasis added)). 
44. See COMM. ON CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH RATES OF INCARCERATION, NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & Steven 
Redburn eds., 2014) (“The unprecedented rise in incarceration rates can be attributed to an 
increasingly punitive political climate surrounding criminal justice policy formed in a period of 
rising crime and rapid social change.”). 
45. The recidivism problem might have been overstated. See, e.g., J.W. LOCKE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T 
OF COMMERCE, NAT’L BUREAU OF STANDARDS, COMPILATION AND USE OF CRIMINAL COURT 
DATA IN RELATION TO PRE-TRIAL RELEASE OF DEFENDANTS: PILOT STUDY 2 (1970), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GOVPUB-C13-f5b5e5adeed0d6f0c7faf442cd8ee7d4/pdf/GOVPUB 
-C13-f5b5e5adeed0d6f0c7faf442cd8ee7d4.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DEP-Z76R] (providing statistics 
from a four-week period in 1968 in Washington D.C. showing that of 712 defendants who entered 
the District of Columbia Criminal Justice System, 11% of those released charged with 
misdemeanors or felonies were subsequently re-arrested on a second charge during the release 
period). But this rate is not wildly out of line with today’s levels of recidivism upon release—it is 
actually lower than what some jurisdictions experience today. See BRIAN REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 - STATISTICAL TABLES 15 
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that crimes committed by individuals released pretrial remained a 
significant problem,46 in spite of the 1966 reforms.47 
Civil unrest during the mid-to-late 1960s played a critical role in 
shifting perspectives.48 Across the country, prosecutors and courts 
adopted ad hoc policies of preventive detention to “safeguard” the 
community from further unrest.49 The 1968 Kerner Commission50 even 
recommended that under emergency conditions like civil disorder, the 
judiciary should have pretrial plans and procedures that “permit 
separation of minor offenders from those dangerous to the community, 
in order that serious offenders may be detained.”51 In many ways, the 
                                                     
(2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf [https://perma.cc/C29F-J93B] (showing 
that nationally, 16% of released defendants were rearrested). 
46. Here, the perception of pretrial recidivism mattered as much as—if not more than—reality. In 
1969, Alan Dershowitz noted that the “net result of bail reform [from 1966] . . . has been that more 
criminal defendants spend more time out on the street awaiting their trials than ever before. This has 
led to an increase—or at least the appearance of an increase—in the number of crimes committed 
by some of these defendants.” Alan M. Dershowitz, On ‘Preventive Detention’, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 
Mar. 13, 1969, at 22 (emphasis added). 
47. Miller, supra note 39, at 32.  
48. Of course, civil unrest and disorder of the 1960s “helped foster a receptive environment for 
political appeals for harsher criminal justice policies and laws.” COMM. ON CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH RATES OF INCARCERATION, supra note 44, at 115. 
49. In fact, civil unrest during the mid-to-late 1960s played a direct role in these changes. The 
12th Street Riot in Detroit, Michigan is an illustrative example. On July 23, 1967, police raided an 
unlicensed speakeasy, where nearly 100 people were celebrating the return of two black servicemen 
from Vietnam. Soon, a riot started, sparked by rumors of police abuse. The riot lasted for five days 
and left forty-three people dead, over 1,000 injured, and more than 7,000 arrested. In response to the 
disorder, Detroit’s public prosecutor stated that his office would ask for prohibitively high bonds on 
all those arrested “so that even though they had not been adjudged guilty, we would eliminate the 
danger of returning some of those who had caused the riot to the street during the time of stress.” 
William A. Dobrovir, Preventive Detention: The Lesson of Civil Disorders, 15 VILL. L. REV. 313, 
316–17 (1970) (citing Comment, The Administration of Justice in the Wake of the Detroit Civil 
Disorders of July 1967, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1542, 1549–50 (1968)) (emphasis added). One Detroit 
judge was quoted as saying that in cases like this, “[w]e will . . . allocate an extraordinary bond. We 
must keep these people off the streets. We will keep them off.” Id. at 317; see also Criminal Justice 
in Extremis: Administration of Justice During the April 1968 Chicago Disorder, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 
455, 576 (1969). The April 1968 riots which dominated Washington D.C. also temporarily brought 
a new standard for determining whether or not an arrestee should be released before trial: “whether 
in the judge’s view he was likely to contribute to further disorder, to commit further offenses.” 
Dobrovir, supra, at 322 (emphasis added). 
50. The Kerner Commission, also known as the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders, was established by President Lyndon B. Johnson to investigate the underlying causes 
behind the 1967 race riots in the United States. The Commission found that poverty and institutional 
racism drove inner-city violence and called for aggressive federal spending to advance opportunities 
in African-American communities. See NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., REPORT OF 
THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/8073NCjRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/373j-Ajy7]. 
51. Id. at 17. 
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judicial response to the civil unrest of 1967 and 1968 not only further 
normalized the task of predicting dangerousness, but also of preventive 
detention more generally. 
Against this backdrop, President Richard M. Nixon, elected in 
November 1968, included in his “War on Crime” a call for “temporary 
pretrial detention . . . [for people whose] pretrial release presents a clear 
danger to the community.”52 Citing high-profile crimes committed in 
D.C. and other cities by defendants released pretrial,53 the Nixon 
administration played a key role in raising the issue’s profile.54 Of 
course, the focus of Nixon’s campaign and administration was never 
really on crime per se; race, more than anything, loomed large behind 
Nixon’s “War on Crime.”55 
In 1969, President Nixon’s Attorney General John Mitchell made the 
public argument for the necessity of predictions of dangerousness and 
preventive detention.56 Critically, he did so by drawing upon and 
exploiting logic of the Bail Reform Act of 1966. For example, Mitchell 
observed that the 1966 Act “specifically permits pretrial detention of 
defendants who are charged with capital crimes and are considered 
likely either to flee or pose a danger to the community.”57 Next, Mitchell 
pointed out that no serious constitutional objection had been lodged 
against the practice of predicting a capital defendant’s future 
dangerousness. Finally, he noted that “objections to pretrial detention of 
dangerous defendants on the ground that it is improper to confine those 
not yet convicted apply with equal force to existing pretrial detention 
practices—detention because of risk of flight or of dangerous capital 
offense defendants.”58 Above all, Mitchell argued that society had an 
equal right to assure that “those charged with noncapital but dangerous 
                                                     
52. Presidential Report, 27 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 212, 238 (1969) (statement by President Nixon).  
53. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON CRIME IN D.C., REPORT ON THE METROPOLITAN POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 523 (1966), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951d02987368r;view=1 
up;seq=1 (last visited Nov. 12, 2018). 
54. KARL E. CAMPBELL & SAM ERVIN, LAST OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 217 (2007). 
55. While the “southern strategy” is a historically problematic term, as both Republicans and 
Democrats had associated blackness with criminality, Nixon’s southern strategy was unique in that 
it “rested on politicizing the crime issue in a racially coded manner. Effectively politicizing crime 
and other wedge issues—such as welfare—would require the use of a form of racial coding that did 
not appear on its face to be at odds with the new norms of racial equality.” See COMM. ON CAUSES 
AND CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH RATES OF INCARCERATION, supra note 44, at 116. 
56. John N. Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. REV. 
1223, 1240 (1969). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. (emphasis added). 
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crimes will not expose the community to unreasonable risks of danger 
prior to trial” and that, in making those predictions, “due process of law 
requires fundamental fairness, not perfect accuracy.”59 
Many objected to this line of argument,60 but Mitchell’s arguments 
carried the day. Though the underlying philosophies motivating policy 
change could not have been more different, Nixon-era reformers 
exploited the logic and toolkit of reforms driven by civil rights leaders 
for their own purposes. 
Soon, a second generation of bail changes swept state and federal 
courts, enlisting judges en masse in the work of predicting defendants’ 
dangerousness. The 1970 District of Columbia Court Reform and 
Criminal Procedure Act61 (the D.C. Act) represented the first legislative 
move in this second wave of reform efforts, reaching outside the context 
of capital cases to allow “judges to detain a defendant pretrial without 
setting any bail if the defendant was deemed dangerous to society.”62 
The D.C. Act had an immediate impact across the country: within eight 
years of its enactment, almost half of all states passed legislation 
pointing to danger as a factor in bail decisions.63 By 1984, the number of 
laws passed had grown to thirty-four.64 Four states—Nebraska and 
Texas in 1977, Michigan in 1978, and Wisconsin in 1981—amended 
their state constitutions to allow denial of bail to defendants deemed to 
be dangerous.65 Meanwhile, at the national level, a progression of 
Supreme Court cases—including Jurek v. Texas,66 Bell v. Wolfish,67 
                                                     
59. Id. at 1241–42.  
60. The American Bar Association argued that courts could not “with any degree of tolerable 
accuracy predict in advance the defendants who will commit a further crime.” ABA Opposes 
Preventive Detention in Congressional Testimony, 1 ABA SEC. INDIVIDUAL RTS. & RESPS. NEWSL. 
4 (1969). An ABA committee considering the issue expressed “serious misgivings” on the 
proposals, noting that the “purpose of bail is to insure the defendant’s presence at the time of trial.” 
William H. Erickson, The Standards of Criminal Justice in a Nutshell, 32 LA. L. REV. 369, 377 
(1972). Laurence Tribe and other scholars replied in part that a scheme authorizing pretrial 
detention based on future danger “has all the vices inherent in a law that makes the crime fit the 
criminal.” Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John 
Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 375, 392 (1970). 
61. District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 
84 Stat. 473.  
62. Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 504 
(2012). 
63. Id. at 506. 
64. Id.  
65. Donald B. Jr. Verrilli, Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: Historical 
Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 353–54 (1982). 
66. 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
67. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
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Barefoot v. Estelle,68 and Schall v. Martin69—led the Court to bless 
predictions of dangerousness, and approve the pretrial detention of 
allegedly dangerous defendants, even when they did not pose a flight 
risk.70 
The Reagan administration, with overwhelming Democratic support, 
pushed these changes further, relying on similar tactics and rhetoric as 
the Nixon administration.71 The eventual 1984 Bail Reform Act became 
                                                     
68. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).  
69. 467 U.S. 253 (1984). 
70. Jurek v. Texas did not involve bail or pretrial detention. 428 U.S. at 262. In upholding the 
Texas death penalty statute, the Supreme Court concluded that predictions of dangerousness are “an 
essential element in many of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system. The 
decision whether to admit a defendant to bail, for instance, must often turn on a judge’s prediction 
of the defendant’s future conduct.” Id. at 275. Importantly, the Court observed that though “[i]t is, 
of course, not easy to predict future behavior,” the “fact that such a determination is difficult, 
however, does not mean that it cannot be made.” Id. at 274–75. Bell v. Wolfish considered the 
conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in 
New York City. 441 U.S. at 539. In finding that the MCC’s conditions of confinement did not 
infringe on a pretrial detainee’s constitutional rights, the Court held that, as one scholar puts it, “due 
process only requires that pretrial detainees be free from ‘punishment,’ rather than from a restraint 
of liberty.” Baradaran, supra note 9, at 744. The Court noted that punishment does not exist pretrial 
if an action is “reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. 
“[I]n addition to ensuring the detainees’ presence at trial, [other objectives] may justify [the] 
imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any inference that such 
restrictions are intended as punishment.” Id. at 440. In Barefoot, the Court authorized contentious 
expert testimony about dangerousness in a capital case, further illustrating a growing openness 
toward predictions of future criminality. 463 U.S. at 916. Schall upheld a New York state statute 
that authorized the preventive detention of juvenile delinquents. 467 U.S. at 253. Echoing the 
sentiments of Jurek, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that, “from a legal point of view there is nothing 
inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct” and that the Court had 
“specifically rejected the contention . . . ‘that it is impossible to predict future behavior and that the 
question is so vague as to be meaningless.’” Id. at 278–79 (citation omitted). And though the Court 
had previously left open the question as to whether any government objective other than ensuring a 
pretrial detainee’s presence at trial could survive constitutional scrutiny, the Court in Schall 
definitively closed the door. “Preventive detention [under the statute] serves the legitimate state 
objective, held in common with every State in the country, of protecting both the juvenile and 
society from the hazards of pretrial crime.” Id. at 274. In other words, in Schall, the Court for the 
first time held that pretrial detention based on objective other than ensuring a defendant’s 
appearance at trial passed constitutional muster. 
71. For example, the case for bail reform in the 1980s rested on the familiar perception that the 
rate of pretrial recidivism was “extremely high,” despite strong contradictory evidence. See 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983: Hearing on S. 829 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal 
Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 285, 286 (1983) (statement of LeRoy S. 
Zimmerman, National Association of Attorneys General) (testifying that because “the rate of 
recidivism for individuals released on bail is extremely high, consideration must be given to the 
dangerousness of the defendant and the risk to the community should he be released on bail pending 
trial”); H.R. REP. NO. 98-1121, at 11 (1984); Bail Reform Act of 1981–82: Hearing on H.R. 3006, 
H.R. 4264, and H.R. 4362 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of 
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 87 (1981) (prepared statement of Guy 
Willetts, Chief of the Pretrial Services Branch, Division of Probation, Administrative Offices of the 
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law with broad support.72 It “made public safety a central concern in the 
judicial officer’s choice [among] . . . pretrial custody options.”73 For the 
first time at the federal level,74 judges were asked to predict the danger a 
defendant’s release posed to the community.75 By 1984, 
“dangerousness” was included as a factor in bail decisions under federal 
law and in nearly two-thirds of the states. 
But these laws suffered from a common problem: how to define 
“danger.” Clues from the federal law pointed to a fairly broad definition 
of what judges could consider. For example, the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary’s report noted that “the risk that a defendant will continue 
to engage in [drug] trafficking constitutes a danger to the ‘safety of any 
other person or the community.’”76 Even the risk of non-violent crimes, 
such as those against property, satisfied this expansive “danger” 
standard. State laws also consistently failed to provide specific standards 
to determine whether a defendant was “dangerous.”77 
Despite these deficiencies, in 1987, the Supreme Court upheld the 
Bail Reform Act of 1984 as constitutional, and in turn, sanctioned 
preventive detention and predictions of dangerousness pretrial.78 In 
United States v. Salerno,79 the Court held that the Eighth Amendment 
does not grant an individual an absolute right to bail, that the denial of 
bail on the basis of dangerousness does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment, and that pretrial detention was a regulatory act, not 
                                                     
United States Courts) (testifying that in a sample of ten jurisdictions, “new crimes committed by 
federal offenders released on bail occurred at a rate of 8.4 percent”). 
72. Stuart Taylor Jr., Senate Approves an Anticrime Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1984 (“The Senate 
today passed a bipartisan package that supporters call the most significant Federal anticrime 
measure in more than a decade. The vote was 91 to 1.”). 
73. Goldkamp, supra note 10, at 42. 
74. See, e.g., United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 158–59 (3d. Cir. 1986) (“The 1984 Act 
marks a radical departure from former federal bail policy. Prior to the 1984 Act, consideration of a 
defendant’s dangerousness in a pretrial release decision was permitted only in capital 
cases . . . . Under the new statute judicial officers must now consider danger to the community in all 
cases in setting conditions of release.” (emphasis added)).  
75. Notably, the legislative history of the 1984 law demonstrates that Congress clearly understood 
they were transforming the fundamental premise of bail. See, e.g., Curtis E. Karnow, Setting Bail 
for Public Safety, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 7 (2008). 
76. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 103 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3196, 1983. 
77. Goldkamp, supra note 10, at 17–18. (“Over one-third of the public safety-oriented laws 
provide no definition of danger. . . . In approximately half of the states with explicit references, the 
definition of danger is vague.”) 
78. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“In our society, liberty is the norm, and 
detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception. We hold that the provisions 
for pretrial detention in the Bail Reform Act of 1984 fall within that carefully limited exception.”). 
79. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
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punishment.80 In just over two decades, the predictive task of a bail 
hearing was fundamentally transformed. By 1987, states were passing 
laws mandating that “public safety be the primary [predictive] 
consideration” at a bail hearing.81 
Throughout this period, conservative-minded reformers publicly 
argued that their set of bail reforms would make bail more honest by 
eliminating sub rosa detention through high bail. But more than three 
decades later, “after federal and state statutes were rewritten . . . [to] 
permi[t] judges to order dangerous defendants to be detained, money 
bail is still used as a back-door means to manage dangerousness.”82 
In fact, what began in the mid-1960s as an effort to reduce poverty-
based detention ended in the mid-1980s with a law that led to immediate 
and lasting increases in pretrial detention.83 Bail reform’s pivot in the 
late 1960s from a focus on unnecessary pretrial detention, to a focus on 
widespread prediction of dangerousness, took a mere two years. 
Critically, this pivot relied on law and order reformers successfully 
subverting the logic and tools of previous liberal reform efforts. That 
current reform efforts bear striking similarities to those discussed here 
should caution liberal reformers.84 
II. BAIL IN PRACTICE TODAY 
Across the country, after someone is arrested, they appear at a bail 
hearing. Sometimes the accused appears in court via videoconference 
from jail. Other times, the accused, en masse, sit in a makeshift 
courtroom in a jail for their arraignment. Specific practices vary widely 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Nevertheless, at bail, the law generally 
                                                     
80. Id. at 753–55 (rejecting “the proposition that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits 
the government from pursuing other admittedly compelling interests through regulation of pretrial 
release” and noting that “when Congress has mandated detention on the basis of a compelling 
interest other than prevention of flight, as it has here, the Eighth Amendment does not require 
release on bail”). 
81. Karnow, supra note 75, at 8. 
82. Gouldin, supra note 23, at 863.  
83. The U.S. Marshals Service found that there was “a 32 percent increase in prisoner 
population . . . during the first year after its passage.” John Riley, Preventive Detention Use 
Grows—But Is It Fair?, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 24, 1986, at 1. Three years later, a General Accounting 
Office report found that the 1984 Bail Reform Act led to a “greater percentage of defendants 
remain[ing] incarcerated during their pretrial period under the new law than under the [1966] law.” 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-88-6, CRIMINAL BAIL: HOW BAIL REFORM IS 
WORKING IN SELECTED DISTRICT COURTS 18 (1987) https://www.gao.gov/assets/150/145896.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K8QE-6CV2]. 
84. See infra section II.C.  
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asks a judge to assess the risk that a defendant will flee the jurisdiction, 
or whether the defendant would pose a danger to the community if 
released. The judge is asked to order the least restrictive set of 
conditions needed to ensure the defendant appears at future court dates 
and does not harm the community in the meantime.85 
If a judge predicts, or a bail schedule requires, that no feasible 
combination of conditions could adequately ensure the defendant’s 
appearance for their trial, nor protect public safety, then that individual 
is non-bailable, or not eligible for release before trial. These defendants 
will be remanded to custody and will wait in jail until their trial or other 
resolution of their case. On the other hand, if a judge believes that the 
defendant will appear for trial and does not think the defendant will be a 
danger to the community if released, or believes that some set of 
conditions would ensure these criteria, then that individual is bailable 
and eligible for some form of pretrial release. Complicating matters, in 
some jurisdictions a judge is constrained by a bail schedule, where 
certain crimes merit certain statutorily determined conditions. 
There are three basic approaches to release: 
Release on personal recognizance (sometimes called “ROR”): The 
defendant promises to reappear for his or her future court dates with no 
judicially imposed restrictions or conditions.86 
Conditional release: The defendant is released with non-monetary 
conditions, such as a requirement to check in with a pretrial services 
agency, undergo drug treatment, or wear a GPS monitoring anklet.87 
Release on bond: A set financial obligation is defined that the 
defendant will have to pay if she fails to return to court when required. A 
secured bond means the defendant must pay the amount up front in order 
to be released from jail, while an unsecured bond means that the 
defendant is released without paying but will become liable for the 
defined amount if she fails to appear in the future.88 
                                                     
85. Again, practices can vary widely across jurisdictions. We only generalize the process for the 
sake of clarity. 
86. See, e.g., WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(a) (“Any person, other than a person charged with a 
capital offense, shall at the preliminary appearance or reappearance . . . be ordered released on the 
accused’s personal recognizance pending trial unless [one of several factors is met].”). 
87. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT § 135.230(d) (2017) (“‘Conditional release’ means a nonsecurity 
release which imposes regulations on the activities and associations of the defendant.”). 
88. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-123(2a), (3) (2018) (“[A]ny judicial officer may impose any 
one or any combination of the following conditions of release: . . . Require the execution of an 
unsecured bond; [or] [r]equire the execution of a secure bond which at the option of the accused 
shall be satisfied with sufficient solvent sureties, or the deposit of cash in lieu thereof.”). 
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Judges can also combine an offer of conditional release with a 
financial bond. Even when a judge sets a condition of release, the 
defendant still may not be freed before trial. For example, when a 
secured bond amount is set, the defendant remains in jail unless and until 
that money is given to the authorities. Many jurisdictions abide by a “10 
percent” rule, where defendants only need to post 10% of a bond to 
secure their release that day. Funds can come from the defendant 
directly, from a friend, relative or community member, from a bail fund, 
or from a commercial bail bondsman (more on that below). But across 
the country, low income defendants struggle and are often unable to 
raise the necessary funds. Even though a judge has approved a path for 
their release, they remain in jail. 
A. Motivations for Reform 
Bail decisions can upend people’s lives. Before a trial has begun, 
without any finding of guilt, a judge may nonetheless deprive the 
defendant of her liberty, or impose a range of other burdens, during the 
weeks, months, or years that may pass until guilt or innocence is finally 
determined. Those who are denied bail, or who are offered it on terms 
they cannot afford, must stay in jail until trial. While they wait, they 
often lose their jobs, face eviction from their homes, and otherwise 
watch their lives crumble. 
Pretrial detention plays a central role in America’s globally 
extraordinary patterns of incarceration. On any given day in the United 
States, more than 400,000 individuals are detained and awaiting trial.89 
The total population estimated to be in local jails nationally is up about 
20% since 2000, and 95% of that growth is attributable to people 
awaiting trial.90 
Two specific motivations deserve to be highlighted. First, the 
longstanding ills of money bail remain. Inability to pay bail is the 
primary reason why pretrial defendants stay in jail until the disposition 
of their cases.91 Compounding the problem, the proportion of felony 
                                                     
89. TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2014, 
at 3 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9P3-KCR5]. 
90. Id. at 4.  
91. The most recent statewide data available shows that 38% of felony defendants in the largest 
seventy-five counties were detained until the end of their case. Of that group, about 90% were 
detained because they were unable to meet the financial conditions offered for release. The 
percentages are essentially the same for felony defendants in state courts, too. REAVES, supra 
note 45; see also THOMAS COHEN & BRIAN REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF 
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defendants subject to some financial condition for their release has 
skyrocketed.92 
Second, and relatedly, the human cost of pretrial detention is 
staggering. A growing body of research indicates that pretrial detention 
itself directly increases the probability of worse case outcomes for the 
defendant—meaning a guilty plea or conviction at trial.93 Further, recent 
research shows that pretrial detention worsens the risks that judges aim 
to predict. That is, pretrial detention itself leads to higher rates of pretrial 
rearrests, more failures to appear, and greater long-term recidivism than 
the same defendants would have shown if immediately released.94 This 
finding has significant import for our core thesis, discussed in 
sections III.B.2 and B.3. 
B. The Shape of Current Reforms: Away from Money, Toward Risk 
Today’s reform efforts mark what some call the third generation of 
bail reform.95 The pace of reform is rapid, and the shape of reforms is 
varied. A central goal of most of these efforts is to end the wealth-based 
system, and move pretrial justice systems toward a risk-based model.96 
                                                     
FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 2 (2007), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NZ9N-XACT]. 
92. From 1990 to 2009, the overall percentage of felony cases involving some sort of financial 
condition for release rose from just over one-third to nearly two-thirds of all releases. Meanwhile, 
the fraction of outright releases (without conditions) declined apace. See REAVES, supra note 45. 
93. KRISTIAN LUM & MIKE BAIOCCHI, THE SAUSAL IMPACT OF BAIL ON CASE OUTCOMES FOR 
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS 1 (July 15, 2017) (“It has long been observed that those who are detained 
pre-trial are more likely to be convicted, but only recently have formal causal inference methods 
been brought to bear on the problem of determining whether pre-trial detention causes a higher 
likelihood of conviction. In each case where causal inference methods were used, a statistically 
significant effect was found.” (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted)); id. at 4 (“We find a strong 
causal relationship between setting bail and the outcome of a case . . . for cases for which different 
judges could come to different decisions regarding whether bail should be set, setting bail results in 
a 34% increase in the chances that they will be found guilty.”); see also EMILY LESLIE & NOLAN G. 
POPE, THE UNINTENDED IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION ON CASE OUTCOMES: EVIDENCE FROM 
NYC ARRAIGNMENTS (2016); MEGAN STEVENSON, DISTORTION OF JUSTICE: HOW INABILITY TO 
PAY AFFECTS CASE OUTCOMES (2016). 
94. See Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of 
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. (2017); CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, MARIE 
VANNOSTRAND & ALEXANDER HOLSINGER, LAURA AND JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., THE HIDDEN 
COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION (2013); Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman & Ethan Frenchman, 
The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization, 45 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 3 (2016).  
95. Timothy R. Schnacke, Claire M.B. Brooker & Michael R. Jones, The Third Generation of 
Bail Reform, DEN. L. REV. ONLINE (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.denverlawreview.org/dlr-
onlinearticle/2011/3/14/the-third-generation-of-bail-reform.html [https://perma.cc/N64N-6PSY]. 
96. SCHNACKE, supra note 16, at 36. 
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In many states, legislatures are the first movers of reform. Since 2012, 
over 500 bills across all fifty states were enacted related to pretrial 
justice, including financial and non-financial conditions for release, 
pretrial services and supervision, diversion programs, citation in lieu of 
arrest, and victim support and services.97 In 2016, forty-four states 
enacted nearly 120 laws related to pretrial administration.98 Almost two-
thirds of those states enacted some sort of law related specifically to 
pretrial diversion.99 
Twelve states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government 
have enacted a statutory presumption that defendants charged with 
bailable offenses be released on personal recognizance or unsecured 
bond “unless a judicial officer makes an individual determination that 
the defendant poses a risk that requires more restrictive conditions or 
detention.”100 Six more states have done so by court rule.101 
Recent legislation also directly targets money bail. In June 2017, 
Connecticut passed legislation that barred “cash-only” bail for certain 
crimes and prohibits courts from imposing a financial condition of 
release on defendants charged with only a misdemeanor crime.102 New 
Jersey’s comprehensive bail reforms took effect in January 2017, 
virtually eliminating cash bail across the state.103 Illinois enacted 
legislation in June 2017 that requires judges to use the least restrictive 
conditions to assure a defendant’s appearance, with a presumption that 
any conditions of release would be non-monetary.104 In early 2017, New 
                                                     
97. TRENDS IN PRETRIAL RELEASE 2017, supra note 6. 
98. TRENDS IN PRETRIAL RELEASE 2018, supra note 6, at 5. 
99. Id. 
100.  ARTHUR W. PEPIN, CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, 2012-2013 POLICY PAPER 




102. An Act Concerning Pretrial Justice Reform, 2017 Conn. Acts 716 (Reg. Sess.). Three 
exceptions exist to the new misdemeanor release rule: if (1) person is charged with a family 
violence crime, (2) if a person requests such conditions, or (3) court makes a finding on the record 
that there is a likely risk that the arrested person will fail to appear in court, will obstruct or attempt 
to obstruct justice, or threaten, injure or intimidate or attempt to threaten, injure or intimidate a 
prospective witness or juror, or the arrested person will engage in conduct that threatens the safety 
of himself or herself or another person. Id.  
103. Act of Aug. 11, 2014, ch. 31, 2014 N.J. Laws 467. 
104. Bail Reform Act of 2017, No. 100-1, 2017 Ill. Legis. Serv. (West). The law also allows the 
state supreme court to establish a pretrial risk assessment tool, but does not require it. The state’s 
Administrative Office of the Courts already indicated its support for pretrial risk assessment, as did 
the Illinois Supreme Court in a statewide policy statement. See Illinois Supreme Court Adopts 
Statewide Policy Statement for Pretrial Services, ILL. ST. BAR ASS’N: ILL. LAW. NOW (May 1, 
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Orleans’s City Council passed an ordinance eliminating cash bail for 
defendants charged with minor, non-violent crimes.105 A new rule 
promulgated by Maryland’s Court of Appeals that instructs judges to 
first look to non-financial conditions of release went into effect on July 
1, 2017, after the legislators in the state failed to pass new legislation 
before their session ended.106 Atlanta’s City Council passed an ordinance 
eliminating a cash bond requirement for low-level offenses107; Alaska 
enacted new reforms that eliminate money bail for most defendants108; 
and multiple New York City district attorneys have ordered prosecutors 
not to request money bail in most cases.109 
Among the most popular reforms are policies that introduce or expand 
pretrial services and, at the same time, either introduce or expand 
actuarial risk assessment. Since 2012, at least twenty laws in fourteen 
states either created or standardized the use of pretrial risk assessment.110 
In 2014 alone, eleven laws were passed to regulate how risk assessment 
tools were used pretrial. Almost half of the states that passed laws 
relating to pretrial services between 2012 and 2014 authorized or created 
statewide pretrial service programs.111 Cities and counties across the 
country have experimented with pretrial risk assessment—some develop 
their own tools, while others implement or purchase another tool.112 
Among policymakers, actuarial tools enjoy broad support across the 
political spectrum. The American Bar Association specifically 
recommends that judges use actuarial models in making bail 
                                                     
2017), https://www.isba.org/iln/2017/05/01/illinois-supreme-court-adopts-statewide-policy-
statement-pretrial-services [https://perma.cc/TS5K-XM23]. 
105. Jessica Williams, City Council Unanimously Passes Overhaul to Municipal Court Bail 
System: Fewer Defendants Will Have to Post Bail, NEW ORLEANS ADVOC. (Jan. 12, 2017), 
http://www.theadvocate.com/new_orleans/news/courts/article_eb41d288-d90b-11e6-b99c-
4bb3e5442d1b.html [https://perma.cc/BFP9-E8NJ]. 
106. Michael Dresser, Maryland Court of Appeals: Defendants Can’t Be Held in Jail Because 
They Can’t Afford Bail, BALT. SUN (Feb. 8, 2017), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-md-bail-rule-20170207-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/VC79-G8LD]. 
107. Rhonda Cook, Atlanta Mayor Signs New Ordinance Changing Cash Bail System in a Nod to 
the Needy, ATLANTA-J. CONST.: MYAJC, (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://www.myajc.com/news/local/atlanta-council-oks-changes-cash-bail-system-nod-the-
needy/SW50dABJAtWgBwpB4vtgBN/ [https://perma.cc/XF8M-JPMZ]. 
108. Senate Bill 91: Summary of Policy Reforms, ALASKA JUST. F., Spring 2016, at 1, 2–4. 
109. James C. McKinley Jr., Some Prosecutors Stop Asking for Bail in Minor Cases, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/09/nyregion/bail-prosecutors-new-york.html (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2018). 
110. WIDGERY, supra note 6, at 1. 
111. Id. at 3. 
112. Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 442 (2016). 
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determinations.113 A cohort of prominent public defense and criminal 
defense groups recently called for “the use of validated pretrial risk 
assessment in all jurisdictions, as a necessary component of a fair 
pretrial release system.”114 The National Association of Counties 
recently adopted a resolution calling on the U.S. Department of Justice 
to advise state and county governments to adopt pretrial risk assessment 
and eliminate commercially secured bonds.115 The Conference of State 
Court Administrators (COSCA)116 and the Conference of Chief Justices 
have both called for the use of risk assessment.117 
Most notably, during the time in which this Article was being edited, 
California passed, and its governor signed, Senate Bill 10 into law.118 
The law completely eliminates California’s money bail system, 
replacing it with a system based on risk assessment.119 Despite 
significant, looming implementation hurdles—including a proposed 
referendum to repeal it120—the law is scheduled to take effect October 1, 
2019.121 
                                                     
113. ABA, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE 5–6 (3d ed. 2007) (see 
standard 10.1.10 discussing the role of the pretrial services agency in determining release eligibility 
for defendants). 
114. GIDEON’S PROMISE ET AL., supra note 7, at 4. The groups involved included the American 
Council of Chief Defenders, Gideon’s Promise, the National Association for Public Defense, the 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the National Legal Aid and Defenders 
Association. See id. at 1. 
115. NAT’L ASSOC. OF CTYS., ADOPTED INTERIM POLICY RESOLUTIONS 11 (2017), 
http://www.naco.org/ [https://perma.cc/22YU-LKM6] (explaining the policy resolution on 
improving the pretrial justice process).  
116. PEPIN, supra note 100. 
117. CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, ENDORSING THE CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT 
ADMINISTRATORS POLICY PAPER ON EVIDENCE-BASED PRETRIAL RELEASE (2013), 
https://ccj.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CCJ/Resolutions/01302013-pretrial-release-Endorsing-
COSCA-Paper-EvidenceBased-Pretrial-Release.ashx [https://perma.cc/9656-249H] (adopting the 
policy as proposed by the CCJ/COSCA Criminal Justice Committee at the Conference of Chief 
Justices midyear meeting). 
118. Act of Aug. 28, 2018, ch. 244, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West) (S.B. 10). 
119. The California Judicial Council is statutorily tasked with “[c]ompil[ing] and maintain[ing] a 
list of validated pretrial risk assessment tools” that jurisdictions may use. Id. § 1320.24(e)(1). 
According to the law, a validated risk assessment tool is one that “shall be demonstrated by 
scientific research to be accurate and reliable in assessing the risk of a person failing to appear in 
court as required or the risk to public safety due to the commission of a new criminal offense if the 
person is released before adjudication of his or her current criminal offense and minimize bias.” Id. 
§ 1320.7(k). 
120. Bob Egelko, Bail Bond Companies Gathering Signatures for Referendum to Keep Them in 
Business, S.F. CHRONICLE (Sep. 11, 2018, 6:10 PM), 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/Bail-bond-companies-seek-to-block-new-law-that-
13221653.php [https://perma.cc/CZ9U-LYMK]. 
121. Act of Aug. 28, 2018, ch. 244, § 1320.6, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West) (S.B. 10). 
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However, a growing chorus of advocates have begun to raise some 
objections. For example, Human Rights Watch argues that pretrial risk 
assessment tools should be opposed “entirely.”122 Over a hundred 
community and advocacy groups in New York recently argued that 
pretrial risk assessment tools will “further exacerbate racial bias in [the] 
criminal justice system” and that the tools will “likely lead to increases 
in pretrial detention in the state.”123 And a broad range of more than 100 
civil rights, social justice, and digital rights groups declared that risk 
assessment instruments should not be used pretrial.124 Those same 
groups detail six principles that any pretrial risk assessment tool must 
follow “in order to ameliorate the strong dangers and risks we see in the 
implementation of risk assessment instruments.”125 
Early evidence on the impact of risk assessment is limited, but the 
nascent findings are troubling. A recent study of Kentucky’s bail 
reforms by Megan Stevenson found that a new risk assessment tool and 
other policy reforms “led to only a trivial increase in pretrial release” 
and, simultaneously, “an uptick in failures-to-appear (FTAs) and pretrial 
crime; a disappointing counter to hopes that all three margins could be 
improved simultaneously.”126 
III. THE CHALLENGES OF PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
Despite pretrial risk assessment’s broad and enthusiastic adoption, 
there are significant reasons for caution. Some of these reasons are 
underappreciated in the public debate. Existing skepticism about the 
adoption of pretrial risk assessment tools centers on concerns of racial 
                                                     
122. John Raphling, Human Rights Watch Advises Against Using Profile-Based Risk Assessment 
in Bail Reform, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jul. 17, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/17/human-
rights-watch-advises-against-using-profile-based-risk-assessment-bail-reform 
[https://perma.cc/V6ZH-2JLM]. 
123. Letter from Over 100 Cmty. & Advocacy Grps. Across N.Y. State to Governor Cuomo 
(Nov. 2017), http://bds.org/wp-content/uploads/Bail-Reform-Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3P5-
ZJAX] (discussing bail reform in New York). 
124. THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS, THE USE OF PRETRIAL “RISK 
ASSESSMENT” INSTRUMENTS: A SHARED STATEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS CONCERNS, (2018) 
[hereinafter LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE SHARED STATEMENT], http://civilrightsdocs. 
info/pdf/criminal-justice/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/DK2Q-8LY3]. 
125. Id. at 2. 
126. Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2018) (manuscript at 5), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3016088 (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2018). 
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bias and on due process inequities, both of which are substantial 
concerns.127 
Though these debates are incredibly important, they have contributed 
to a lack of discussion of a more basic tension between statistical 
prediction and bail reform. On the one hand, to change a broken system, 
policymakers enact and implement policies that work to reduce the risk 
of rearrest and failure to appear. On the other hand, policymakers ask 
statistical tools to forecast those very same risks based on data from the 
very system under reform.128 As a result, without the right conditions 
and policies, risk assessment tools will typically be blind to the helpful 
impact of the very changes that reformers seek to introduce. 
In this Part, we first describe how actuarial risk assessment tools 
work. 
                                                     
127. In particular, ProPublica’s assertion that COMPAS risk assessment tool was “biased against 
blacks” stimulated much of this research. See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 
23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing 
[https://perma.cc/2C6W-5978]. COMPAS’s creator claims that their risk assessment tool is fair 
because it maintains “predictive parity”—meaning that defendants with the same risk score are 
equally likely to reoffend. For example, in Broward County, Florida, 60% of white and 61% of 
black defendants assigned a risk score of seven actually reoffended. See WILLIAM DIETERICH ET 
AL., NORTHPOINTE INC. RESEARCH DEP’T, COMPAS RISK SCALES: DEMONSTRATING ACCURACY 
EQUITY AND PREDICTIVE PARITY (2016), http://go.volarisgroup.com/rs/430-MBX-
989/images/ProPublica_Commentary_Final_070616.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6X6-W4D2]. However, 
among defendants who ultimately did not reoffend, black defendants were twice as likely as white 
defendants to receive a medium or high risk score. Further, white defendants who subsequently 
reoffended had lower average risk scores than their black counterparts. Essentially, black defendants 
were over-classified as risky and unnecessarily subjected to harsher scrutiny. See Julia Angwin et 
al., ProPublica Responds to Company’s Critique of Machine Bias Story, PROPUBLICA (Jul 29, 
2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/propublica-responds-to-companys-critique-of-machine-
bias-story [https://perma.cc/JK4Z-D6YW]. The lesson of the ProPublica piece, however, is that this 
result is inevitable. Where there is a divergent base rate (on average, black defendants recidivate at 
higher rates) and predictive tools like COMPAS must maintain predictive parity (to pass statistical 
muster), a predictive algorithm cannot satisfy both fairness criteria (predictive parity and equalized 
false positive and negative rates) simultaneously. See Jon Kleinberg et al., Inherent Trade-Offs in 
the Fair Determination of Risk Scores, ARXIV (Nov. 17, 2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.05807.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/75NX-7PL9]. COMPAS is also at the center of another debate: due process. In 
Loomis v. Wisconsin, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 2290 
(2017) (mem.), the question presented by the petitioner, Eric Loomis, was whether or not “it [is] a 
violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to due process for a trial court to rely on [proprietary] 
risk assessment results at sentencing: (a) because the proprietary nature of COMPAS prevents a 
defendant from challenging the accuracy and scientific validity of the risk assessment; and 
(b) because COMPAS assessments take gender and race into account in formulating the risk 
assessment?” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Loomis, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (No. 16-6387). 
128. See Gil Rothschild-Elyassi, Johann Koehler & Jonathan Simon, Actuarial Justice, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL CONTROL (Mathieu Deflem ed., 2019) 194–206; see also id. at 203 (noting, 
along similar lines, a “special twist to actuarial justice’s legitimacy puzzle: the very system that 
produced an outcome as illegitimate as mass incarceration must simultaneously be treated as 
legitimate in producing the data on which actuarial justice-based reform efforts must rely”). 
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Section III.B illustrates how current pretrial risk assessment tools will 
likely make “zombie predictions,” where old data, reflecting outdated 
bail practices, are newly reanimated. To do so, the Article focuses 
specifically on two popular strains of reform: creating or expanding 
pretrial services and limiting or eliminating cash bail—describing in turn 
why those reforms are likely to significantly change the risks that risk 
assessment tools seek to forecast. 
Section III.C examines the underappreciated role of decision-making 
frameworks, and the risks associated with their creation. These are 
matrices, akin to bail schedules, that attach a proposed course of action 
for a judge to a risk assessment score. When defendants are 
systematically regarded as riskier than they truly are, today’s decision-
making frameworks may unnecessarily subject defendants to overly 
burdensome, and perhaps counterproductive, conditions of release. As a 
result, risk assessment tools and the accompanying decision-making 
frameworks may actually erode the benefits of risk-reducing bail 
reforms. 
Finally, section III.D explores the long-term dangers that pretrial risk 
assessment tools pose to bail reform and pretrial jurisprudence more 
generally. Pretrial risk assessment tools may further legitimize and 
expand preventive detention. As a result, there is good reason to 
reexamine whether United States v. Salerno was rightly decided. Even 
assuming that Salerno was properly decided, the case nevertheless left 
open significant questions that will have to be resolved—questions that 
the widespread adoption of pretrial risk assessment make all the more 
urgent. 
A. How Pretrial Risk Assessment Works 
Typically, risk assessment tools use data about groups of people, like 
those who have been arrested or convicted, to assess the probability of 
future behavior. The creator of an actuarial tool may test hundreds of 
variables, like a previous failure to appear or age at current arrest, to 
determine which factors when weighed together are most predictive of 
rearrest and failure to appear. 
Although these tools are frequently drawn into broader debates about 
machine learning or artificial intelligence,129 they typically rely on 
                                                     
129. See, e.g., CHELSEA BARABAS ET AL., INTERVENTIONS OVER PREDICTIONS: REFRAMING THE 
ETHICAL DEBATE FOR ACTUARIAL RISK ASSESSMENT 4 (2017) (“Notwithstanding the popular 
discourse on the ethical use of risk assessments, the vast majority of these tools do not use new 
statistical methods frequently associated with ‘artificial intelligence,’ such as machine learning. 
They are overwhelmingly based on regression models.”). 
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longer-established statistical methods, like regression analysis.130 Often 
the fact or manner of their use is new, rather than the techniques 
employed in their creation.131 
Tools vary in the kind and numbers of factors they use. Each included 
factor gets a weighting that reflects how strongly it correlates with 
rearrest or failure to appear.132 For example, historical data might show 
that defendants who are under the age of thirty when arrested are much 
more likely to be rearrested or fail to appear, compared to defendants 
who are over thirty at the time of arrest.133 Accordingly, if person is 
under the age of thirty when arrested, that person might be assigned 
three points. Conversely, a person over thirty might be assigned a single 
point. The greater the numerical value, the more that variable is 
correlated with worse outcomes.134 
When completing a risk assessment, either a human, a computer, or 
some mix of the two will determine the applicable variables and 
calculate the total risk score. Those risk scores are then transformed into 
risk categories or scales. For example, a tool might sort defendants into 
“low risk,” “moderate risk,” “high risk.” 
                                                     
130. Id. at 3–4 (“Regression modeling is particularly well-suited for prediction oriented 
assessment, because it enables researchers to identify variables that are predictive of an outcome of 
interest, without necessarily having to understand why that factor is significant.”); id. (“Regression 
analysis is widely used for purposes of forecasting future events. The main goal of regression is to 
identify a set of variables that are predictive of a given outcome variable. This is achieved by 
determining the optimal weights for a given set of covariates, ones that are best predictive of the 
outcome variable of interest. This is done through processes called model checking and selection, 
whereby statistical tests are run on each covariate to see how significantly predictive they are of the 
outcome variable.”). 
131. There is a thriving debate about how and where the recent growth of machine learning 
methods (sometimes broadly termed “AI”) should stimulate changes to legal doctrine or public 
administration. Most of those questions are not (yet) presented in the pretrial context. It is unclear 
whether these newer technologies should really be seen by the law as something significantly new 
or different. See, e.g., Richard Berk & Justin Bleich, Statistical Procedures for Forecasting 
Criminal Behavior: A Comparative Assessment, 12 CRIM. & PUB. POL’Y 513 (2013) (arguing that, 
after comparing various methods, “[t]here seems to be no reason for continuing to rely on traditional 
forecasting tools such as logistic regression”); Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: 
Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147 (2017); Paul 
Ohm & David Lehr, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine 
Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653–717 (2017). 
132. See generally CYNTHIA A. MAMALIAN, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF 
PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT (2011). 
133. See, e.g., PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST. & JFA INST., THE COLORADO PRETRIAL ASSESSMENT 
TOOL 16 (2012), https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx? 
DocumentFileKey=64908e23-bf3e-9379-1a1f-f2d5b9e1702f&forceDialog=0 
[https://perma.cc/64BL-NUF2]. 
134. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Skeem & John Monahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk 
Assessment, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 38, 39 (2011). 
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1 0–17 91% 95% 87% 
2 18–37 80% 85% 71% 
3 38–50 69% 77% 58% 
4 51–82 58% 51% 33% 
Average 30 78% 82% 68% 
 
In the above example, risk scores are sorted into four categories. 
Those categories represent the rate of rearrest and/or failure to appear. 
For example, a defendant who has a score of 39 falls into Category 3. 
Placement into that category means that, as a group, defendants assessed 
as similar to the current defendant were rearrested 31% of the time and 
failed to appear 23% of the time.137 
 
                                                     
135. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST. & JFA INST., supra note 133, at 18 tbl.2. 
136. Id. at 18. 
137. Id. at 15 fig.2. 
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Figure 1: 
















B. Zombie Predictions 
Pretrial risk assessment tools developed on data that does not reflect 
changing ground realities as a result of risk-mitigating reforms will 
likely make “zombie predictions.”139 That is, the predictions of such a 
pretrial risk assessment tool may reanimate and give new life to old data 
and outcomes from a bail system that is presently under reform. Below, 
we detail the intersection between two common bail reforms, expanding 
pretrial services and cabining money bail, and zombie predictions. We 
finish by examining how such zombie predictions might actually 
dampen the otherwise positive effects of risk-mitigating policy reforms. 
Our criticism of zombie predictions should not be read as a general 
criticism of prediction. Predictions are always based on historical data, 
which, by definition, come from the past. But prediction at bail is 
problematic because the training data often come from times and places 
that are materially different from the ones where the predictions are 
being made, and few actors continuously update tools with new facts. 
                                                     
138. Id. at 15. 
139. We use the term “zombie” here, not in the Oxford English Dictionary’s first-listed sense of 
“a soulless corpse said to have been revived by witchcraft,” but rather in the extended sense 
indicated in the December 14, 2016 online update to the OED’s Third Edition—now listed as the 
“most common sense” of the term—a “similar[ly] mindless creature.” OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY 
ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/232982#eid13494009 (last visited Feb. 10, 
2018). We choose this evocative term and its negative connotations intentionally. 
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Responsible, fully informed prediction, where outcomes are tracked and 
models refined and updated, is not susceptible to this objection. 
1. Today’s Predictions Follow Yesterday’s Patterns 
Using one jurisdiction’s data to predict outcomes in another is an 
inherently hazardous exercise, a challenge that is highlighted in the 
existing literature. When a risk assessment tool’s developmental sample 
does not reflect local conditions, it might not accurately classify risk.140 
Geographic differences in law enforcement patterns, for example, can 
undermine tools’ accuracy. The factors that bring individuals into 
contact with the criminal justice system in one jurisdiction or country 
may not be the same as those for offenders in a different jurisdiction or 
country. Local differences in correctional resources can also make a 
substantial difference in predictive efficacy. In writing about risk 
assessment in the neighboring context of criminal sentencing, John 
Monahan and Jennifer Skeem note that “[v]ariables that predict 
recidivism in a jurisdiction with ample services for offenders may not 
predict recidivism in a resource-poor jurisdiction.”141 
Take the Level of Service (LS) family of assessment instruments as 
an example. The LS tools are some of the most widely used risk and 
needs assessment tools in correctional settings.142 Notably, the tools 
were developed based on the histories of Canadian offenders.143 The 
creators of those instruments found “high predictive validity” in their 
published validation studies.144 But the “predictive performance results 
reported by [other assessors] . . . , especially those outside Canada, have 
not been as favorable.”145 One meta-analysis of LS-instruments found 
that their predictive capacity was significantly worse for U.S. offenders, 
compared to their performance for Canadian and other offenders.146 
                                                     
140. See, e.g., Melissa Hamilton, Adventures in Risk: Predicting Violent and Sexual Recidivism in 
Sentencing Law, 47 ARIZ. ST. L. REV. 1, 33–39 (2015). 
141. John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing, 12 ANN. REV. 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL, 489, 500 (2016).  
142. Grant Duwe & Michael Rocque, Effects of Automating Recidivism Risk Assessment on Reliability, 
Predictive Validity, and Return on Investment (ROI), 16 CRIM. & PUB. POL’Y 235, 239 (2017). 
143. Id. at 240 (“[These tools were] [d]eveloped on samples of Canadian offenders by the 
creators of the RNR approach . . . .”). 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 239. 
146. See MARK E. OLVER ET AL., Thirty Years of Research on the Level of Service Scales: A 
Metaanalytic Examination of Predictive Accuracy and Sources of Variability, 26 PSYCHOL. 
ASSESSMENT. 156, 166 tbl.9 (2014). 
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The same problem could easily apply not only across geography, but 
also across time. Underlying conditions, like economic growth and 
development, can change across time and lead to different results for 
various reasons.147 
Overall, problems arise when the group being assessed “is not similar 
to the developmental sample, [or] the developmental sample is not a 
representative reference for the individual to be assessed.”148 Just as a 
pretrial resource-poor jurisdiction in Wyoming differs in significant 
ways from a pretrial resource-rich jurisdiction in California, so too does 
a single jurisdiction when it significantly changes its bail system. Simply 
put, risk-mitigating policies will likely change the risks a defendant 
faces upon release, just like a change in economic conditions or in time 
can. Overall, using historic, pre-reform outcome data to predict future 
risks within a jurisdiction that significantly reforms its bail system 
deserves heightened, continued scrutiny.149 
The challenge of time-based changes in risk applies equally to 
jurisdictions that develop their own pretrial risk assessment tool from 
scratch, and those that validate a tool developed elsewhere. For tools to 
make well-calibrated predictions from the start, they need to be trained 
on data that matches the conditions about which they are making 
predictions. 
There is strong reason to believe that the data used to build today’s 
risk assessment tools do not match the reality into which the tools are 
deployed. As we detailed in section II.C, jurisdictions across the country 
are pursuing reforms aimed at transforming a defendant’s odds of 
success upon release. But today’s risk assessment tools are not designed 
to incorporate the effects of those reforms. 
For example, consider the publicly available information about the 
Public Safety Assessment (PSA) and Correctional Offender 
                                                     
147. For example, one can imagine that a jurisdiction that experiences substantial and equitable 
economic growth might see rearrest and failure to appear rates decline, given a better overall 
economic environment.  
148. Hamilton, supra note 140, at 37. 
149. In many ways, proposals for periodic, localized revalidation of risk assessment tools are 
similar to our argument. For example, in the criminal sentencing context, Monahan and Skeem 
argue that “[u]nless a tool is validated in a local system—and then periodically revalidated—there is 
little assurance that it works.” Monahan & Skeem, supra note 141, at 500. These proposals capture 
a sense that, within a jurisdiction, outcomes can change and that it is important for policymakers to 
track those changes. Our argument effectively extends and further underscores this conceptual 
point: thanks in part to the reforms that brought many risk assessment tools into existence, outcomes 
within jurisdictions are already changing. The need for what Monahan and Skeem call for in the 
sentencing context is heightened in the pretrial context, where the ground truth of rearrest and 
failure to appear rates may be significantly mitigated by other pretrial policies.  
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Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) were each 
developed on multi-jurisdiction data. PSA, an instrument developed by 
the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, is based on nearly 750,000 cases 
drawn from more than 300 jurisdictions.150 Similarly, COMPAS was 
initially developed on a sample of 30,000 survey responses, 
administered to prison and jail inmates, probationers, and parolees 
across the country, between January 2004 and November 2005.151 In all 
likelihood, there will be some degree of a mismatch between 
jurisdictions from which PSA and COMPAS drew their sample and 
those jurisdictions in which the tools were deployed. 
Pretrial risk assessment tools that are developed locally typically rely 
upon smaller samples of data, often dating from before significant 
reform efforts began. For example, the Florida Pretrial Risk Assessment 
instrument was developed on 1,757 cases across six counties, from 
January to March 2011.152 The Ohio Risk Assessment System’s Pretrial 
Assessment Tool was developed on “over 1,800” cases, from September 
2006 to October 2007.153 The Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment 
Instrument was originally developed on a sample of 1,971 cases between 
July 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999,154 though it was later revised based on 
data from 2005.155 
                                                     
150. LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MODEL FOR PRETRIAL RISK 
ASSESSMENT 3 (2013), https://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF-
research-summary_PSA-Court_4_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/945R-UWVD]. Notably, documents 
recently released in response to public records requests note that the development data for the tool 
came from state court systems in Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Maine, Ohio, and 
Virginia, the District of Columbia, and the federal pretrial system. See ZACH DAL PRA, JUSTICE 
SYS. PARTNERS, LJAF PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT - PSA 27 (2016) 
https://cdn.muckrock.com/foia_files/2016/12/15/Volusia_Stakeholder_Training_10162015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GZW5-3NA7]. 
151. NORTHPOINTE, INC., PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 11 (2015) (“The 
Composite Norm Group consists of assessments from state prisons and parole agencies (33.8%); 
jails (13.6%); and probation agencies (52.6%).”), http://www.northpointeinc. 
com/downloads/compas/Practitioners-Guide-COMPAS-Core-_031915.pdf [https://perma.cc/RK2U-
CPAR]. Agencies using COMPAS Core can select the default norm group, or a more specific 
subgroup, like “male jail” or “male prison/parole” or “female jail.” Id. at 11. 
152. JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., FLORIDA PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT 3–4 (2012), 
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey
=58add716-5e41-eba3-0a3d-f9298f7e1a54 [https://perma.cc/2HSS-LJAT].  
153. Edward J. Latessa et al., The Creation and Validation of the Ohio Risk Assessment System 
(ORAS), 74 FED. PROB. 21 (2010). 
154. MARIE VANNOSTRAND, PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA 10 (2009), 
https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/files/publications/corrections/virginia-pretrial-
risk-assessment-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3ZH-G7UB]. 
155. MARIE VANNOSTRAND, VA. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., ASSESSING RISK AMONG 
PRETRIAL DEFENDANTS IN VIRGINIA: THE VIRGINIA PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT 4 
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Even where bail reform legislation simultaneously introduces broad 
pretrial reforms and risk assessment, the developers tasked with building 
such a tool still have to look backwards for their examples.156 In fact, the 
incentives to look further back in history can be strong. A larger, more 
diverse dataset from which to draw a sample is less likely to contain 
random statistical artifacts that could skew the results. But, in the bail 
context, doing so will also mean a deeper reliance on data that represents 
the historic risks of release, rather than the current ones. 
Take Colorado as an example. A revised version of the Colorado 
Pretrial Assessment Tool (CPAT) was released in October 2012.157 But 
Colorado’s sweeping new bail reform was not signed into law until May 
2013.158 Thus, in Colorado, we would expect to see zombie-style 
predictions that overstate defendants’ true levels of risk. 
The available data suggest that this may indeed have happened. 
Below, we reproduce figures from The Colorado Bail Book: A Defense 
Practitioner’s Guide To Adult Pretrial Release.159




156. Notably, smaller jurisdictions (aside from likely having fewer resources to dedicate to 
pretrial systems) might have fewer examples to create a locally-developed tool and thus have an 
even greater incentive to look farther back.  
157. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST. & JFA INST., supra note 133. 
158. Act of May 11, 2013, ch. 202, 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws 820. 
159. COLO. CRIMINAL DEFENSE INST., COLO. STATE PUB. DEFENDER & NAT’L ASS’N OF 
CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS (NACDL), THE COLORADO BAIL BOOK: A DEFENSE 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO ADULT PRETRIAL RELEASE 51 app. 3 (2015). 
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Table 2: 
CPAT Risk Level Research Projections Compared to Denver 
County Actuals160 
 
 CPAT 1 CPAT 2 CPAT 3 CPAT 4 
CPAT 
Projected 20% 49% 23% 8% 
Denver 
2012 12% 39% 27% 22% 
Denver 
2013  11% 38% 28% 23% 
Denver 
2014 13% 39% 38% 20% 
Avg. Diff. - 8% - 10.33. . .%  + 8% + 13.66. . .% 
 
Here, the number of defendants who the tool’s designers expected to 
be classified as CPAT 3 or CPAT 4—the higher risk categories—is 
compared to the number of defendants who were actually classified as 
CPAT 3 or CPAT 4. The gap is noticeable. Based on their training data, 
the tool’s designers suggested that about a third of defendants would be 
classified as higher risk. But, for each year of data in Denver, essentially 
half of all defendants were assessed as higher risk. Based on the 
available data, it’s unclear why this is the case.161 
Simply classifying more defendants as high risk offers little insight. 
The other side of the coin is, how did defendants who were classified as 
higher risk perform?
                                                     
160. Id. 
161. One might suspect that defendants from Denver are higher risk than other Coloradans and 
were not included, or were not heavily weighted, in the development sample of CPAT. In fact, 
defendants from Denver actually represented 13% of CPAT’s development sample. PRETRIAL 
JUSTICE INST. & JFA INST., supra note 133, at 9.  
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Table 3: 
Failure to Appear Rates Across CPAT Risk Category in Denver162 
 
 CPAT 1 CPAT 2 CPAT 3 CPAT 4 
CPAT 








5% 14% 16% 23% 
Avg. Diff + 1% - 2.5% - 7% - 27.5% 
 
Table 4: 
Failure to Appear Rates Across CPAT Risk Category in Mesa163 
 
 CPAT 1 CPAT 2 CPAT 3 CPAT 4 
CPAT 
Projected 
5% 15% 23% 49% 
2014 Mesa 
Actual 
7% 9% 13% 15% 
Avg. Diff + 2% - 6% - 10% - 34% 
  
                                                     
162. Id. 
163. Id.  
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Figure 2: 




















Table 5:  
New Criminal Offense Rates Across CPAT Category in Denver164 
 
 CPAT 1 CPAT 2 CPAT 3 CPAT 4 
CPAT 








4% 7% 14% 20% 
Avg. Diff - 5.5% - 12.5% - 16.5% - 23% 
                                                     
164. Id.  
08 - Koepke & Robinson (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 12/28/2018  4:27 PM 
2018] RISK ASSESSMENT AND THE FUTURE OF BAIL REFORM 1763 
 
Table 6: 
New Criminal Offense Rates Across CPAT Category in Mesa165 
 
 CPAT 1 CPAT 2 CPAT 3 CPAT 4 
CPAT 
Projected  9% 20% 31% 42% 
2014 Mesa 
Actual 11% 21% 25% 28% 
Avg. Diff + 2% + 1% - 6% - 14% 
 
Figure 3: 



















We find similar evidence in efforts to develop and validate the Public 
Safety Assessment.166 The rate of failures to appear in the PSA’s 
developmental sample167 diverged from the rate of failures to appear in 
                                                     
165. Id.  
166. DAL PRA, supra note 150, at 31–32, 46–47. 
167. The developmental sample for PSA came from jurisdictions in Colorado, Connecticut, 
Florida, Kentucky, Ohio, Maine, Virginia, Washington D.C. and the Federal Pretrial Services. See 
LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA USED TO DEVELOP THE PUBLIC SAFETY 
ASSESSMENT, http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/Criminal-Justice-Data-Used-to-
Develop-the-Public-Safety-Assessment-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3ZE-YRZ5].  
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jurisdictions where PSA was subsequently validated.168 As Table 6 
demonstrates for the top four risk grades—that is defendants receiving 
FTA scores of 3, 4, 5, and 6—defendants on whom the PSA was 
actually used (that is, those in the validation sample) succeeded more 
often than their counterparts in the developmental sample. We see less of 
this phenomenon with respect to “new criminal activity” rates in 
Table 7. Nevertheless, it appears that defendants who are assessed as 
higher risk, in reality, present a lower risk than expected upon release. 
 
Table 7: 
Failure to Appear Rates Across PSA FTA Categories169 
 




10% 15% 20% 31% 35% 40% 
PSA 
Validation 12% 16% 18% 23% 27% 30% 
Avg. Diff. + 2% + 1% - 2% - 8% - 8% - 10% 
 
Table 8: 

















10% 15% 23% 30% 48% 55% 
PSA 
Validation 9% 15% 21% 34% 43% 52% 
Avg. Diff. - 2% + 0% - 2% + 4% - 5% - 3% 
 
This is the stark, unfortunate irony at the heart of today’s bail reform: 
today’s pretrial risk assessment tools reflect and reinforce the very 
patterns of failure to appear that new, innovative policies work to 
                                                     
168. DAL PRA, supra note 150, at 31, 46.  
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
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change. Below, we consider specifically how these other policy changes 
may be shaping changes in failure to appear and rearrest risk. 
2. Expanded Pretrial Services Will Change the True Risk of Failure 
to Appear 
Small changes in the administration of bail can have a substantial 
impact on failure to appear rates in a jurisdiction. Many of these reforms 
are relatively low-cost and low-tech, such as text message reminders 
about upcoming court dates. Creating pretrial service agencies in 
jurisdictions that do not already have them, and expanding funding for 
those agencies already in place, will likely further curb the incidence of 
failures to appear.171 Of course, a given intervention may reduce failure 
to appear more in one population than another. For example, low-income 
defendants, who may lack stable housing, might disproportionately 
benefit from text message reminders, as opposed to physical postcards 
sent by mail. 
“Failure to appear” often reflects factors far more prosaic than a 
defendant absconding from the jurisdiction. As a 2001 National Institute 
of Justice report noted, when “released defendants miss a court 
appearance, it is often not because they are fleeing from prosecution but, 
rather, for other reasons ranging from genuine lack of knowledge about 
the scheduled date to forgetfulness.”172 
What causes such non-flight failures to appear? Considering the 
available data for similarly charged defendants who are unable to meet 
financial conditions of release, it is likely that financial needs play a 
prominent role for those who do obtain release. People with jobs that 
have inflexible hours, or that require a significant commute, might find it 
difficult or impractical to miss work for a court date. A defendant might 
also fail to appear because they simply forget about an upcoming court 
appearance. They may be afraid or have insufficient information about 
how to get to court, what to do once there, and what will happen next. 
Some observers emphasize the slow pace of justice, arguing that “the 
typically long period of time between the citation and the court date 
                                                     
171. See, e.g., MARIE VANNOSTRAND, KENNETH J. ROSE & KIMBERLY WEIBRECHT, PRETRIAL 
JUSTICE INST., STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF PRETRIAL RELEASE RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
SUPERVISION (2011); NAT’L ASSOC. OF PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES, STANDARDS ON PRETRIAL 
RELEASE 15 (3d ed. 2004) (“Pretrial programs are a vitally important part of [a criminal justice 
system] because they perform functions that, in their absence, are often performed inadequately or 
not at all.”). 
172. BARRY MAHONEY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL 
SERVICES PROGRAMS: RESPONSIBILITIES AND POTENTIAL 38 (2001). 
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naturally leads to [failures to appear] due to the relative instability of 
many defendants.”173 One study found that the amount of time between a 
defendant’s release and the disposition of her case was the most 
important factor in predicting failures to appear.174 Others argue that 
defendants are often “unaware that failing to show up for court can lead 
to an arrest warrant for seemingly minor violations of the law.”175 Still 
others counter that deliberate refusals to appear in court are 
commonplace. These are the risks that reforms are motivated to 
mitigate.176 
A series of studies suggests that reminders, alone, may make a major 
difference. For example, administrators in Jefferson County, Colorado 
implemented live-caller reminders where, if the caller “successfully 
contacted a defendant, she read a script (in either English or Spanish) 
reminding the defendant of the court date, giving directions to the court, 
and warning the defendant of the consequences of failing to appear for 
court.”177 The results of the program were described as “exceptional.”178 
In 2010, “the court-appearance rate for defendants who were 
successfully contacted was 91%, compared to an appearance rate of 71% 
for those who were not.”179 
A study in fourteen counties across Nebraska found that postcard 
reminders significantly reduced failure to appear rates.180 The study 
examined three different types of postcard reminders (all in 
English/Spanish): one reminder-only postcard with just a notification, 
                                                     
173. Timothy R. Schnacke, Michael R. Jones & Dorian M. Wilderman, Increasing Court-
Appearance Rates and Other Benefits of Live-Caller Telephone Court-Date Reminders: The 
Jefferson County, Colorado, FTA Pilot Project and Resulting Court Date Notification Program, 48 
CT. REV. 86, 87 (2012). 
174. STEVENS H. CLARKE, JEAN L. FREEMAN & GARY KOCH, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BAIL 
SYSTEMS: AN ANALYSIS OF FAILURE TO APPEAR IN COURT AND REARREST WHILE ON BAIL 34 
(1976). 
175. Schnacke, Jones & Wilderman, supra note 173, at 87. 
176. PRETRIAL JUSTICE CTR. FOR COURTS, USE OF COURT DATE REMINDER NOTICES TO 
IMPROVE COURT APPEARANCE RATES 1 (2017) (“Several jurisdictions across the country have 
adopted a court date reminder process (or court date notification system) to improve court 
appearance rates, such as in Coconino County (AZ), Jefferson County (CO), Lafayette Parish (LA), 
Reno (NV), New York City (NY), Multnomah and Yamhill Counties (OR), Philadelphia (PA), King 
County (WA), and the states of Arizona, Kentucky, and Nebraska. Recently, Judge Timothy C. 
Evans, Chief Judge of the Cook County Circuit Court in Illinois, issued an order requiring the 
county to implement a pretrial notification system by December 1, 2017.”). 
177. Schnacke, Jones & Wilderman, supra note 173, at 91. 
178. Id. at 92. 
179. Id. 
180. Alan Tomkins et al, An Experiment in the Law: Studying a Technique to Reduce Failure to 
Appear in Court, 48 CT. REV. 96, 100 (2012). 
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one reminder postcard that included the threat of sanctions for failure to 
appear, and one that included both the threat of sanctions and other 
elements of procedural justice.181 All led to significant reduction in 
failures to appear.182 
Other initiatives look to capitalize on SMS text messages as a 
reminder. For example, the Court Messaging Project—an open-source 
initiative from Stanford’s Legal Design Lab—works to “to make the 
court system more navigable and to improve people’s sense of 
procedural justice—that the legal system is fair, comprehensible, and 
user-friendly.”183 In New York City, a recent experiment found that 
simple text reminders reduced failures to appear by 21%, while those 
with more information led to a 26% drop.184 Uptrust, a company “which 
sends text message reminders to attend court and other obligations” 
claims it can reduce failure to appear rates by 75%.185 
Other reforms might reduce a defendant’s flight risk, too. For 
example, electronic monitoring—a contentious, highly invasive 
condition of release—already has a long history of pretrial use, and may 
deter defendants from fleeing.186 But unlike reminders—whose 
effectiveness is documented in a wide range of studies—the efficacy of 
GPS monitoring for reducing flight from the jurisdiction remains an 
open question.187 But it is certainly plausible to imagine that electronic 
monitoring would effectively deter some accused people who might flee 
from actually fleeing. If so, such an intervention would further reduce 
the risk of pretrial failure, compared with historical outcomes.188 
But consider New York City. At a recent public event, the City’s 
Criminal Justice Agency announced that it would be developing a new 
                                                     
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 98–100. 
183. The Court Messaging Project, STAN. LEGAL DESIGN LAB, 
http://www.legaltechdesign.com/CourtMessagingProject/ [https://perma.cc/GJ82-K3QQ]. 
184. BRICE COOKE ET AL., USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 




185. What We Do - Our Results, UPTRUST, http://www.uptrust.co/what-we-do#our-results-section 
[https://perma.cc/GJ82-K3QQ]. 
186. Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE. L.J. 
1344, 1365 (2014). 
187. Id. at 1368–69. Most focus on post-conviction proceedings, though a few studies have 
examined the effectiveness at pretrial (albeit with small sample sizes). 
188. Though, as we noted, the incidence of flight from a jurisdiction in 2017 is probably minimal. 
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risk assessment tool, based on seven years of criminal justice data.189 
According to the announcement, source data for the new model would 
come from 2009–2015.190 But the City’s arrest practices during that 
period have been held unconstitutional,191 and therefore are not and 
should not be a reliable guide, legally or statistically, to who will be 
arrested in the future. That is particularly true for the very groups of 
people, like young men of color, who were disproportionately stopped, 
questioned, and frisked during this period of time.192 
Complicating matters even further, the City only recently began an 
expansive supervised release program in March 2016.193 Earlier release 
programs were only pilot programs in select areas. Thus, as it is 
currently envisioned, New York City’s new risk assessment tool will 
base its predictions primarily on the outcomes of unsupervised release, 
even though it is being deployed in a setting where more releases can be 
supervised. As a result, more defendants might be classified as a high 
risk of failure to appear simply because the new model does not reflect 
their greater likelihood of reappearance thanks to supervision. At the 
margin, this would likely lead some defendants who could succeed on 
release (indeed, some of the very ones who could be most helped by the 
new program) to be jailed instead. In addition, the City recently began 
sending text message reminders to all accused people for whom it has a 
mobile number, building on a successful trial deployment.194 
Of course, New York City is just a microcosm. Today’s suite of 
pretrial risk assessment tools were largely “trained” on populations that 
did not receive the benefit of newly-enacted, risk-mitigating reforms.195 
                                                     
189. Dr. Richard Peterson, Research Director, N.Y.C. Criminal Justice Agency, Address at 
Measuring Justice: Redesigning New York City’s Pretrial Risk Assessment and Recommendation 
System (Sept. 18, 2017). 
190. Id.; N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT 2016, at 2 (2018), 
https://www.nycja.org/measuring-justice-panel/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2018). 
191. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 540, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
192. See Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.nyclu.org/en/stop-and-
frisk-data [https://perma.cc/B94T-2KR2] (observing that in 2009–2015 blacks and Latinos 
represented more than 80% of stops). 
193. CINDY REDCROSS, MELANIE SKEMER, DANNIA GUZMAN, INSHA RAHMAN & JESSI 
LACHANCE, NEW YORK CITY’S PRETRIAL SUPERVISED RELEASE PROGRAM: AN ALTERNATIVE TO 
BAIL 4 (2017), https://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/SupervisedRelease%20Brief%202017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2GQ3-XRWV]. 
194. See New Text Message Reminders for Summons Recipients Improves Attendance in Court 
and Dramatically Cuts Warrants, N.Y.C., http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/058-
18/new-text-message-reminders-summons-recipients-improves-attendance-court-dramatically 
[https://perma.cc/4GCZ-8VT6]. 
195. Despite studies and pilot projects demonstrating the success of live-caller reminders, 
postcard reminders, and other reminders in helping reduce the number of failures to appear, the 
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As a result, the question that today’s tools answer is, “how likely is this 
defendant to return to court on schedule without being reminded to 
appear?” The tools do not measure, because the historical data does not 
and cannot reflect, the greater chance that some defendants will reappear 
after being reminded. 
3. Replacing or Cabining Money Bail Could Reduce the True Risk of 
Rearrest for Those Released 
Transformative bail reforms that reduce or altogether eliminate 
money bail—if they lead, as expected, to many more releases on 
recognizance—are likely to reduce the risk of pretrial rearrest. As 
detailed above,196 research demonstrates that pretrial detention itself 
actually increases risk of pretrial rearrest once a defendant is released. 
And current statistics clearly show that money bail is the main reason 
defendants spend any significant amount of time in jail pretrial.197 
Accordingly, policies that would reduce or eliminate money bail, and 
release those who would otherwise be held on small bail amounts, are 
likely to have a significant effect. Such policies would likely reduce the 
number of people who spend any time in jail pretrial. As a result, 
released defendants will likely face a lower risk of rearrest following 
their immediate release from custody. In short, by reducing the incidence 
of pretrial detention, jurisdictions may also reduce the overall level of 
rearrest risk. 
Recent research lends support to this hypothesis.198 Professors Paul 
Heaton, Sandra Mayson, and Megan Stevenson, find that if defendants 
in Harris County, Texas who were assigned the lowest amount of cash 
bail ($500) had simply been released instead, the county would have 
released 40,000 more defendants pretrial between 2008 and 2013.199 
They further find that if those defendants had been directly released (and 
                                                     
majority of pretrial service agencies have not adopted these relatively low-tech techniques. For 
example, the findings from a 2009 Pretrial Justice Institute survey for pretrial service programs 
found that from 1989 to 2009, the percentage of programs that called the defendant before a 
scheduled court date declined from over 40% in 1989 to 30% in 2009. In 2009, about 5% of 
programs used an automated dialing system to call and remind the defendant. The percentage of 
programs that produced a manually generated reminder letter in 1989 was just under 40%, but in 
2009 was about 4%, while about 17% used automatically generated reminder letters. Almost 10% of 
surveyed pretrial service agencies had no court date reminder procedures at all. See PRETRIAL 
JUSTICE INST., 2009 SURVEY OF PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAMS 50 (2009). 
196. See supra section III.B.3. 
197. See Heaton, Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 94. 
198. Id.  
199. Id. at 787. 
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did not spend any time in jail at all between arraignment and trial), these 
defendants as a group would have committed 1,600 fewer felonies and 
2,400 fewer misdemeanors than they ultimately did after their eventual, 
later releases.200 They find that pretrial detention increases the share of 
defendants charged with new misdemeanors by more than 13% thirty 
days post-bail hearing, and increases the share of defendants charged 
with new felonies by more than 30% within one-year post-bail 
hearing.201 
If Harris County abandoned their bail schedule in favor of a 
presumption of release on personal recognizance, the effect could be 
significant.202 The incidence of pretrial detention would likely 
significantly decline. Such a policy would, in turn, accomplish what 
Heaton, Mayson, and Stevenson simulate: reduce the number of pretrial 
rearrests, and of rearrests post-case disposition. 
Yet, a risk assessment tool developed on data that predates these 
reforms would not capture this new ground truth. Such a risk assessment 
tool would, oddly, compare post-reform defendants, who benefitted from 
being released immediately, to a very different group: defendants who 
were detained a few days or several weeks before being able to meet 
their financial conditions of release. 
Here, the risk assessment tool would be blind to the range of possible 
risk-mitigating reforms and would instead look back to pre-reform 
outcomes to characterize the defendant’s risk. Doing so will, in all 
likelihood, overstate those defendants’ risk of rearrest.203 And in 
jurisdictions where a higher risk assessment score for rearrest can lead to 
                                                     
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 768 tbl.8. 
202. Judge Lee H. Rosenthal’s April 28 injunction on Harris County’s bail system effectively 
forces this to occur. Her order required the sheriff’s office to release those charged with 
misdemeanors within twenty-four hours of their arrest, unless they are wanted on a detainer from 
other jurisdictions, on immigration proceedings, on mental health concerns, or are held family 
violence protection measures. Since early June, more than 2,600 defendants have been released on 
personal bond. See Gabrielle Banks & Mihir Zaveri, Harris County’s Bail Battle to Resume Before 
Fifth U.S. Circuit in October, CHRON (Aug. 1, 2017, 12:55 PM), 
https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Harris-County-s-historic-bail-battle-to-resume-
11723175.php [https://perma.cc/26RR-ZB8Z]. 
203. As detailed above, if defendants assigned the lowest bail amounts had been directly released 
(and did not spend any time in jail at all between arraignment and trial), these defendants as a group 
would have committed 1,600 fewer felonies and 2,400 fewer misdemeanors than they ultimately did 
after their eventual, later releases. Now, imagine two different risk assessment tools: one built on 
pre-reform data, and one built on post-reform data. In all likelihood, the post-reform risk assessment 
would observe significantly fewer pretrial rearrests, indicating a diminished risk of pretrial release. 
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presumptive pretrial detention hearing, like New Jersey,204 it is possible 
that some poor defendants will be jailed because, historically, the jailing 
of people similarly situated left those people incredibly ill-prepared to 
succeed on release. 
4. Zombie Predictions May Dampen the Positive Effects of Other 
Reforms 
Zombie predictions might perversely undermine the apparent impact 
of other bail reforms. A robust literature on the communication and 
framing of risk suggests that judges will perceive “risky” defendants as 
tainted, and will treat them differently.205 Thus, zombie predictions may 
steer a sizable number of defendants away from risk-mitigating reforms 
and, in turn, dampen the positive effects of policy reforms. In turn, such 
systematic over-prediction of risk may make the ground realities in a 
jurisdiction seem worse than they truly are. That is, policymakers may 
see that there are more “risky” defendants in their jurisdiction than they 
might have expected. Accordingly, policymakers might second-guess 
their pursuit of risk-mitigating reforms and focus on more punitive, 
restrictive conditions of release. This potential feedback loop is subtle, 
and may be hard to detect, but it should nevertheless concern 
reformers—if they cannot champion the positive results of new policies 
and procedures, their endeavor may backfire. 
                                                     
204. Previously, Rule 3:4A(b)(5) indicated that “The court may consider as prima facie evidence 
sufficient to overcome the presumption of release a recommendation by the Pretrial Services 
Program established pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162–25 that the defendant’s release is not 
recommended (i.e., a determination that “release not recommended or if released, maximum 
conditions” (emphasis omitted)). State v. Mercedes, 183 A.3d 914, 922–23 (N.J. 2018). In State v. 
Mercedes, the state supreme court revised the rule to read as follows: “The standard of proof for the 
rebuttal of the presumption of pretrial release shall be by clear and convincing evidence. To 
determine whether a motion for pretrial detention should be granted, the court may take into account 
information about the factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2A:162–20.” Id. at 926. As Justice Albin noted in his 
concurrence, “[t]he pretrial services recommendation, through the court rule, could have operated to 
undermine the rebuttable presumption favoring pretrial release.” Id. at 931 (Albin, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
205. See, e.g., MORRIS E. CHAFETZ, THE TYRANNY OF EXPERTS: BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON THE 
CULT OF EXPERTISE 103 (1996); Leam A. Craig & Anthony Beech, Best Practice in Conducting 
Actuarial Risk Assessments with Adult Sexual Offenders, 15 J. SEXUAL AGGRESSION 193, 197 
(2009); Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the 
Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 906 (2003); Nicholas Scurich et al., 
Innumeracy and Unpacking: Bridging the Nomothetic/Idiographic Divide in Violence Risk 
Assessment, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 548, 548 (2012); Nicholas Scurich & Richard S. John, The 
Effect of Framing Actuarial Risk Probabilities on Involuntary Civil Commitment Decisions, 35 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 83 (2011); Paul Slovic et al., Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Communication: 
The Effects of Using Actual Cases, Providing Instruction, and Employing Probability Versus 
Frequency Formats, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 271 (2000). 
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Once risk is overestimated, defendants may be subject to stricter 
conditions of release through the decision-making framework.206 This 
observation is especially relevant given the literature on how lower-risk 
defendants perform with certain release conditions.207 Studies have 
shown that lower-risk defendants succeed on release (meaning fewer 
failures to appear, and fewer rearrests upon release) more often when 
released without conditions, and that placing conditions of release on 
lower-risk defendants can actually worsen their odds of success.208 
Such a scenario—where defendants are systematically overestimated 
as riskier than they truly are, leading lower-risk defendants to be 
subjected to conditions of release that are counterproductive—could 
perversely sustain an avoidably elevated pretrial failure rate. Similarly, a 
systematic overestimation of rearrest risk may lead jurisdictions to 
unduly lean on more controversial, restrictive reforms, such as electronic 
monitoring. 
Consider a hypothetical defendant. She was assessed by a pretrial risk 
assessment tool that was developed on historical data that predates her 
county’s bail reform. The tool forecast her to be a moderate failure to 
appear risk and rearrest risk. Accordingly, the jurisdiction’s decision-
making framework called for her to be subject to monthly in-person 
reporting to pretrial services, monthly phone check-ins, as well as a 
curfew. In reality, she was a busy single mother, who simply needed a 
timely phone reminder to ensure her appearance. If she had been 
assessed as a lower failure to appear risk, that’s the only intervention she 
would have received. However, the zombie prediction led her to then be 
subject counterproductive conditions of release. As a single mother, the 
in-person check-ins and curfew were difficult to manage. Ultimately, she 
failed to appear for some of her court dates, but appeared to most. This 
hypothetical is of course stylized. But the risks are plausible given the 
implementation of today’s bail reforms. 
                                                     
206. Decision-making frameworks are discussed more in the next section. 
207. See generally CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP & MARIE VANNOSTRAND, EXPLORING THE 
IMPACT OF SUPERVISION ON PRETRIAL OUTCOMES (2013) (finding that “the differences between 
those who received pretrial supervision and those who did not was most pronounced for higher-risk 
defendants”); Marie VanNostrand & Gena Keebler, Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court, 
FED. PROBATION, Sept. 2009, at 30, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fed_probation 
_sept_2009_test_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/63ZB-4B6Y] (“Paradoxically, when required of lower-risk 
defendants, i.e., risk levels 1 and 2, release conditions that included alternatives to detention were 
more likely to result in pretrial failure. These defendants were, in effect, over-supervised given their 
risk level.”). 
208. See LOWENKAMP & VANNOSTRAND, supra note 207; VanNostrand & Keebler, supra note 207. 
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As an example, consider New Jersey. Below is a comparison of the 
percentage of defendants that the state expected would be subject to each 
set of conditions of release—what New Jersey calls pretrial monitoring 
levels (PML)209—versus the actual percentages of defendants who were 
subject to each level.210 
 
Table 9: 







Avg. %s  
1/1/17-12/31/17 
Net difference 
ROR 26.9 7.5 - 19.4 
PML 1 24.6 20.6 - 4.0 
PML 2 16.3 14.8 - 1.5 
PML 3 9.8 26.4 + 16.6 
PML 3 + 2.4 8.3 + 5.9 
Detention 5.1 18.1 + 13.00 
                                                     
209. ACLU OF N.J., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS & STATE OF N.J. OFFICE OF THE 
PUB. DEF., THE NEW JERSEY PRETRIAL JUSTICE MANUAL 11 (2016) [hereinafter N.J. PRETRIAL 
JUSTICE MANUAL], https://www.nacdl.org/NJPretrial/ [https://perma.cc/R6V3-5BSG]. 
210. Chart A: Initial Release Decisions for Criminal Justice Reform Eligible Defendants January 
1 – December 31, 2017, N.J. COURTS, 
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/courts/assets/criminal/cjrreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PWV-
GVTY]; see also Chart A: Initial Release Decisions for Criminal Justice Reform Eligible 
Defendants January 1, 2018 – September 30, 2018, N.J. COURTS, 
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/cjrreport2018.pdf?cacheID=R6PoVYo 
[https://perma.cc/M69V-RZDG].  
211. Chart A: Initial Release Decisions for Criminal Justice Reform Eligible Defendants January 
1 – December 31, 2017, supra note 210. 
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Figure 4: 



























ROR 26.9 8.8 - 18.1 
PML 1 24.6 17.2 - 7.4 
PML 2 16.3 17.3 + 1.0 
PML 3 9.8 27.2 + 17.4 
PML 3 + 2.4 5.7 + 3.3 
Detention 5.1 19.2 + 14.1 
 
Here, about one-third more defendants were subject to the most 
restrictive conditions of release, or were denied release, than the state 
anticipated. And while the state expected nearly a quarter of defendants 
to be released on recognizance, only 7.5–8.8% of defendants were. 
Meanwhile, while only 10% of defendants were supposed to be subject 
to the relatively intense monitoring known as PML 3, in fact more than a 
                                                     
212. Chart A: Initial Release Decisions for Criminal Justice Reform Eligible Defendants January 
1, 2018 – September 30, 2018, supra note 210. 
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quarter were. The projected and actual intensities of pretrial supervision 
are nearly perfectly reversed. 
Based on available data, it is difficult to explain these gaps.213 One 
potential explanation is that more defendants than expected were 
charged with crimes that carry a presumptive recommendation detention 
or high-levels of supervision. Another possibility is that defendants have 
systematically been overestimated as risky, and thus subject to more 
punitive and restrictive conditions of release. Similarly, it could be that 
defendants’ risk was assessed as lower, but judges systematically 
increased conditions of release. Of course, all the above could be true. 
But, under this Article’s argument, when defendants are 
systematically overestimated as riskier than they truly are (and thus 
subject to conditions of release that are potentially counterproductive), 
jurisdictions could, perversely, sustain an avoidably elevated pretrial 
failure rate.214 As a result, policymakers in the future might look back on 
the move toward non-financial conditions of release as misguided and 
might inaccurately conclude that, despite its ills, a money bail system is 
the least bad option. 
Here, the history of bail reform is instructive: conservatives in the late 
1960s used the logic of liberal reforms to, in turn, advocate for a 
broader, more punitive system. Similarly, though pretrial risk assessment 
tools currently enjoy bipartisan support in the mission of decarceration, 
pretrial risk assessment tools and decision-making frameworks are 
vulnerable to a new “law and order” turn. In fact, New Jersey’s Attorney 
General just recently released modified guidance related to its decision-
making framework, adjusting many recommendations to favor lower 
standards for pretrial detention.215 
                                                     
213. To our knowledge, New Jersey has not released data on failure to appear or rearrest rates for 
2017. Nor has New Jersey released data on how many defendants received what kind of PSA 
classification. Thus, we cannot compare risk forecast, against conditions of release, against pretrial 
failure rates. As a result, we cannot clearly evaluate whether or not defendants were systematically 
overestimated as riskier than they truly were. Nor can we see the effects these conditions of release 
have. 
214. We do not suggest that in every case this would be true. Of course, local conditions vary 
considerably. Some jurisdictions might have put a premium on releasing a majority of defendants on 
their own recognizance, or with the minimal set of conditions. Others might experience a decline in 
cases where certain charges require certain more restrictive conditions of release. 
215. For example, many modifications “recalibrate[d] the presumptions for pretrial-detention 
applications that are triggered by the PSA scores” downward. See Memorandum from Christopher 
S. Porrino, N.J. Att’y Gen. to Director, Div. of Criminal Justice et al. (May 24, 2017), 
http://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases17/Revised-AG-Directive-2016-6_Introductory-Memo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/722W-TVX2]. 
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C. Frameworks of Moral Judgment 
Between any statistical estimate of risk and the deciding judge, there 
is an important mediating layer—a series of choices about what the risk 
estimates mean, how much risk is tolerable, how to manage that risk, 
and how to communicate that information to a judge. Though there is 
growing public debate about the quantitative interstices of risk 
assessment, there is relatively little discussion of the vital policy 
judgments that render those risk numbers into actionable advice.216 
These policy judgments are often represented in matrices, somewhat 
interchangeably referred to as a “structured decision-making process,” 
“pretrial decision-making matrix,” “decision making framework,” 
“praxis,” or, most recently, a “release conditions matrix.”217 These 
                                                     
216. See, e.g., Sam Corbett-Davies, Emma Pierson, Avi Feller & Sharad Goel, A Computer 
Program Used for Bail and Sentencing Decisions was Labeled Biased Against Blacks. It’s Actually 
Not That Clear, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2016/10/17/can-an-algorithm-be-racist-our-analysis-is-more-cautious-than-
propublicas/?utm_term=.33e6169658ac [https://perma.cc/8Q3U-25HS]; Sam Corbett-Davies, 
Sharad Goel & Sandra González-Bailón, Even Imperfect Algorithms Can Improve the Criminal 
Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/upshot/algorithms-bail-criminal-justice-system.html (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2018); Issie Lapowsky, One State’s Bail Reform Exposes the Promise and Pitfalls 
of Tech-Driven Justice, WIRED (Sept. 5, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/bail-reform-
tech-justice/ [https://perma.cc/G9YK-7JUZ]; Adam Liptak, Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s 
Secret Algorithms, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-software-programs-secret-
algorithms.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2018); Megan Stevenson, Opinion, In US Bail Reform, 
Justice-By-Algorithm Can Only Go So Far, HILL (Feb. 2, 2018, 8:15 AM), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/371954-in-us-bail-reform-justice-by-algorithm-can-only-go-
so-far [https://perma.cc/6V3U-GW64]; Elizabeth Glazer, Hannah Jane Sassaman & Jon Wool, 
Debating Risk-Assessment Tools: Experts Weigh in on Whether Algorithms Have a Place in our 
Criminal Justice System, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 25, 2017, 2:29 PM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/10/25/debating-risk-assessment-tools 
[https://perma.cc/43MU-XA7R]; Logan Koepke, A Reality Check: Algorithms in Courtroom, 
MEDIUM (Dec. 21 2017), https://medium.com/equal-future/a-reality-check-algorithms-in-the-
courtroom-7c972da182c5 [https://perma.cc/S3ZR-TN6X]; Jon Schuppe, Post Bail, NBC NEWS 
(Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/specials/bail-reform [https://perma.cc/VPE4-SYFZ].  
217. See generally MONA DANNER, MARIE VANNOSTRAND & LISA SPRUANCE, RACE AND 
GENDER NEUTRAL PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT, RELEASE RECOMMENDATIONS, AND 
SUPERVISION: VPRAI AND PRAXIS REVISED (2016), 
https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/files/publications/corrections/race-and-gender-
neutral-pretrial-risk-assessment-release-recommendations-and-supervision.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LER3-HTB2]; N.J. COURTS, PRETRIAL RELEASE RECOMMENDATION DECISION 
MAKING FRAMEWORK (DMF) (2018), 
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/decmakframwork.pdf [https://perma.cc/L598-
Y5W3]; LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT IMPLEMENTATION 
GUIDES: 9. GUIDE TO THE RELEASE CONDITIONS MATRIX (2018) [hereinafter GUIDE TO THE 
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matrices attach risk assessment scores to a proposed course of action for 
a judge or pretrial service agency. The frameworks are similar to bail 
schedules. But, where charged offenses might have previously 
determined outcomes in bail schedules, risk assessment scores guide 
conditions of release (or non-release) in decision-making frameworks. 


























In the above example, a defendant who receives a new criminal arrest 
score of four (“NCA 4”) and a failure to appear score of three (“FTA 3”) 
would be suggested for what New Jersey calls “pretrial monitoring 
level 2” (“PML 2”). Each pretrial monitoring level calls for different 
non-financial conditions of release, with each increase in pretrial 
monitoring level calling for a requisite increase in the number or kind of 
conditions. For example, PML 2 includes various conditions for a 
                                                     
RELEASE CONDITIONS MATRIX], https://psapretrial.org/implementation/guides/managing-
risk/guide-to-the-release-conditions-matrix (last visited Nov. 6, 2018). 
218. N.J. COURTS, supra note 217, at 4. 
219. Id. 
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pretrial defendant like reporting once a month in person, once a month 
by phone, and abide by some set of other restrictions, like a curfew.220 
In addition to the moral and political question of how to respond to 
risk, there are essential factual questions at the core of risk assessment 
implementation that today’s instruments make no attempt to answer. 
These questions concern responsiveness: how will various defendants 
respond to particular pretrial services and conditions? Pretrial risk 
assessment instruments do not speak to which conditions will work best, 
or will prove harmful, for which defendants. 
In short, it is vitally important to understand that the specific contents 
of these grids are not supplied by statistical evidence. For all the public 
discussion of validation and evidence-based practice, implementing a 
risk assessment still requires someone to use clinical judgment to 
estimate, non-statistically, which defendants would be helped or harmed 
by which conditions. 
To be sure, some numbers do exist that bear on this question—for 
example, as discussed above, studies have found that imposing 
burdensome conditions can actually increase the risks posed by low risk 
defendants. But when a jurisdiction applies such findings or assesses 
local numbers to create its own grid, it inevitably must run such numbers 
through a filter of human judgment. Even in the most evidence-based of 
jurisdictions, the decision-making framework necessarily reflects expert 
opinion about which conditions tend to work well for whom. And such 
opinions, while a vital resource, should not be regarded as scientific 
findings. 
1. Undemocratic Justice 
Determining how much risk a society should tolerate, and then 
formalizing those answers inside decision-making frameworks, is a 
difficult political and moral question, not a primarily technical one. To 
date, however, this decision has generally not been a target of considered 
political or policy debate. 
                                                     
220. Id. at 10. Note that, in some jurisdictions, some charges or circumstances may predetermine 
an outcome where pretrial detention will be ordered regardless of the risk assessment result. 
Typically, these charges might include murder, rape, first degree robbery, felony domestic violence, 
violation of a protective order, felony sex crimes, or charges involving the use of a weapon. Another 
example of a DMF matrix can be seen in Volusia County, Florida. There, the release with 
conditions level 1 requires monthly reporting, release with conditions level 2 requires bi-weekly 
reporting, and release with conditions level 3 requires weekly in-person meeting. See DAL PRA, 
supra note 150, at 50. 
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The description of a defendant or group of defendants as “high risk,” 
for example, singles that group out for different treatment, and there is 
no mathematical rule about how expansive the category should be, or 
what it should or does mean.221 
To see the quandary, it may be helpful to imagine defendants lined up 
in descending order of their respective risk levels as calculated by a 
statistical model. The most widely used metric for the performance of a 
risk assessment instrument is the “Area Under the Curve” (AUC) metric, 
which simply measures the likelihood that when two individuals are 
picked at random, the one with the higher score actually does have a 
higher true level of risk.222 In other words, the AUC measures the extent 
to which a risk tool places different defendants into correct rank order of 
riskiness for whatever the tool measures. The AUC does not, however, 
say anything about the size of the difference in risk level between any 
two individuals, or between any two deciles in the risk distribution. 
The question of how to define and use risk categories, in short, may 
best be answered by tandem consideration of three things—a 
community’s preferences and moral judgments; the specifics of how 
“risk” has been defined and measured; and a histogram that literally 
displays the shape of how that risk is distributed in the population of 
defendants. 
To date, few if any jurisdictions have successfully combined these 
elements. Instead, risk categories are defined by technicians and 
interpreted (or at times misinterpreted) by judges. One advocate who 
works on bail reform across many U.S. jurisdictions told us that, when 
he asks judicial system stakeholders what “high risk” means in their 
jurisdiction, many confess ignorance and others speculate that high risk 
many mean a greater than 50% chance of reoffends.223 (In fact, even for 
                                                     
221. This is especially true where the Public Safety Assessment’s dashboard displays a “stop 
sign” when a defendant’s new criminal activity is too high and is deemed to be an “elevated risk of 
violence.” See LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT 10, 
https://nccalj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Virginia-Bersch-PSA-State-of-North-Carolina.pdf 
(2016) [https://perma.cc/7SP9-7WXM] (PowerPoint presentation).  
222. Jay P. Singh, Predictive Validity Performance Indicators in Violence Risk Assessment: A 
Methodological Primer, 31 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 8, 19 (2013) (“[A] number of performance 
indicators are available to researchers . . . the AUC has become ubiquitous in studies attempting to 
establish predictive validity.”). 
223. More generally, the vocabulary used in the pretrial risk context—“this person is a high 
risk”—largely diverges from how individuals perceive the assessed risk. That is: though an 
individual may be assessed as “high risk,” the rate of reoffense for the “high risk” group may 
resemble a probability that is rather low, not “high.” Take the earlier CPAT example. The “highest 
risk” category of failure to appear in the PSA is 40%. Within the internal logic of the pretrial risk 
assessment tool and relative sample, 40% is “high risk.” But more generally, a 40% probability that 
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the highest risk categories, the actual failure rates are much lower than 
this). 
Further, the process by which a society determines and formalizes 
answers to how much risk to tolerate must be a democratic one. There is, 
potentially, a strong incentive for certain actors within the criminal 
justice system to perpetuate relatively high levels of pretrial detention. 
This is especially true of private actors who contract with local 
governments.224 
This is not to say that local governments should be wary of expert 
help available from private industry, just that those actors should not 
play an outsized role in developing decision-making frameworks. Nor 
should policymakers rely upon a decision-making framework 
successfully developed and deployed in another jurisdiction. True, there 
may also be a strong political incentive to rely on contractors. A 
message that a framework, developed by experts, which has succeeded 
elsewhere, might seem attractive. However, the question addressed is 
about the community. Thus, the process should include elected 
policymakers, judges, public defenders, individuals returning from 
incarceration, advocates, prosecutors, and the general public.225 A broad-
based coalition would not only likely enhance perceptions of a decision-
making framework’s legitimacy, but also empower communities to stick 
with their plan of reform after high-profile incidents of pretrial crime. 
D. Longer-term Dangers 
Beyond the immediate concerns detailed above, a bail reform 
movement predicated on the widespread adoption of pretrial risk 
assessment also presents at least three longer-term dangers to the norms 
                                                     
some event will occur could easily be understood as “unlikely” or “doubtful.” See, e.g., RICHARDS 
J. HEUER, JR., PSYCHOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 154–55 (1999); Zonination, Perceptions 
of Probability and Numbers - Gallery, GITHUB, https://github.com/zonination/perceptions 
[https://perma.cc/96BZ-9JZS]. 
224. That is to say, so long as “problems” continue to exist, private actors can continue to sell 
their services to help alleviate that problem. 
225. Here, Mesa, Colorado actually serves as a good example. Officials developed a pretrial 
working group which consisted of “Judges, Public Defenders, District Attorneys, Private Defense 
Lawyers, Pretrial Services Officials, Mesa County Jail Officials, and Victim Advocates.” See MESA 
CTY., MESA COUNTY EVIDENCE-BASED PRETRIAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE 6 (2015), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170202153208/http://www.apainc.org/wp-content/uploads/Mesa-
County-Evidenced-Based-Pretrial-Implementation-Guide-1.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2018). 
Ultimately, “new Guidelines were developed collaboratively, albeit through many heated and 
confrontational meetings . . . . The Chief Judge, the District Attorney and the Sheriff signed this 
document, which showed a strong collaborative framework. The public and private defenders also 
showed support in the development and implementation of this document.” Id. at 11.  
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and jurisprudence of pretrial justice. First, statistical risk assessment—
including future machine learning-based approaches—may insulate 
poorly defined concepts of “dangerousness” from essential scrutiny. 
Second, the embrace of a risk-based approach could ultimately trigger an 
increase in preventive detention. Third, the constitutionality of 
preventive detention will be left unexamined because pretrial risk 
assessments tacitly presume that Salerno’s core holding was correct. 
1. Insulating Nebulous Concepts of “Dangerousness” From Scrutiny 
One of the great ironies of the push to consider dangerousness at bail 
is that none of the professional communities involved has seized the 
mantle to define dangerousness. As Marc Miller and Norval Morris 
argued, by initially considering predictions of dangerousness to be “‘the 
province of psychiatry,’ lawyers foreclosed appropriate jurisprudential 
consideration of the use of predictions.”226 That reliance came at a time 
when psychiatrists disclaimed their ability as a profession to predict 
future dangerousness.227 With no one stakeholder claiming the mantle, 
courts began to allow “much greater reliance . . . on psychological 
predictions of dangerousness than do the organized professions of 
psychiatry and psychology.”228 
This pattern of de facto abdication of responsibility by lawyers and 
jurists continues today, but with the developers of risk assessment tools 
stepping into the extra-judicial, expert role formerly filled by 
psychologists.229 As risk assessment designers move from today’s 
logistic regression-based techniques toward more complex machine 
learning techniques, this may reinforce lawyers’ impression that they do 
not belong at the table. If lawyers conceive predictions of pretrial failure 
                                                     
226. Marc Miller & Norval Morris, Predictions of Dangerousness: Ethical Concerns and 
Proposed Limits, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 393, 404 (1987). 
227. Brief for Am. Psychiatric Ass’n as Amicus Curiae at 12, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 
(1983) (No. 82-6080) (“The unreliability of psychiatric predictions of long-term future 
dangerousness is by now an established fact within the profession.”). 
228. Miller & Morris, supra note 226. 
229. As an example, consider the Public Safety Assessment’s prediction of “New Violent 
Criminal Activity.” “Violent criminal activity” might, on the surface, seem like a good 
approximation for “dangerousness.” But, as detailed above, the PSA was developed on data from 
nearly 200 different counties and cities and nearly 100 federal judicial districts, which, as a group, 
do not share a uniform definition of violent felonies. Thus, when the PSA tool claims to predict 
“New Violent Criminal Activity,” it may not be possible to state precisely what the PSA’s violence 
model is even trying to predict. Put differently, the instrument may have as its outcome variable a 
statistical amalgam that does not precisely match any real world definition of “violence,” and is 
instead unaccountably intermediate among the range of definitions employed by the jurisdictions in 
its training set.   
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as the province of the data scientists who design new, advanced pretrial 
risk assessment tools, they may, yet again, foreclose appropriate 
jurisprudential consideration of the use of those predictions. Similarly, 
courts may begin to place much greater reliance on what a sophisticated 
computer program says, even though data scientists disclaimed their 
program’s ability to predict pretrial failure for a specific individual. 
2. The Expansion of Preventive Detention 
A bail regime predicated on pretrial risk assessment may reduce the 
overall incidence of pretrial detention, especially where a risk 
assessment replaces a money bail system. Simultaneously, however, 
such a bail regime could lead to an increase in the number of defendants 
who are preventively detained pretrial—meaning they were never 
offered a path of release. For various reasons, explored more below, 
such a development should concern bail reformers. 
Consider Maryland. Statewide, one quarter of defendants are held 
without bail after their initial appearance.230 One explanation for this 
level of detention may be that only eleven out Maryland’s twenty-four 
counties have pretrial service agencies.231 As a result, judges may feel 
that they must detain some individuals that they would otherwise release 
if the necessary supports or services were available. However, that 
theory does not explain the results we see elsewhere in the state. In fact, 
only two counties in Maryland use both pretrial risk assessment and 
pretrial services.232 Montgomery County, the state’s largest, is one of 
them.233 In September 2016, only 3.4% of defendants were held without 
bail after their initial appearance.234 One year later, as of September 
2017, 19.3% of defendants were held without bail after their initial 
                                                     
230. MD. JUDICIARY, IMPACT OF CHANGES TO PRETRIAL RELEASE RULES 33 (2018), 
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/media/newsitem/reference/pdfs/impactofbailreviewre
port.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3LV-238E]. 
231. JAMES AUSTIN & JOHNETTE PEYTON, MARYLAND PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT DATA 
COLLECTION STUDY app. B at 34 (2014), http://goccp.maryland.gov/pretrial/documents/2014-
pretrial-commission-final-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8BQ-XDNS]. 
232. CHRISTINE BLUMAUER ET AL., ADVANCING BAIL REFORM IN MARYLAND: PROGRESS AND 
POSSIBILITIES 26 (2018), 
http://wws.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/content/Advancing_Bail_Reform_In_Maryland_2018-
Feb27_Digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZBQ7-EYQK]. 
233. Bail System Reform FAQ, MD. ATT’Y GEN., 
http://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/Pages/BailReform.aspx [https://perma.cc/57BE-4WBQ] 
(“Montgomery County and St. Mary’s County are using a validated risk assessment tool for every 
defendant.”).  
234. MD. JUDICIARY, supra note 230, at 19. 
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appearance.235 St. Mary’s County, the other Maryland County with both 
pretrial risk assessment and services agency, saw the population of 
defendants held without bail grow from 5.7% in September 2016 to 
15.7% in September 2017.236 
Similarly, three months after reforms were enacted in New Jersey, 
12.4% of defendants were preventatively detained.237 As of December 
2017, nearly 20% of defendants are detained without bail.238 Of course, 
these statistics belie the greater number of detention motions filed. In 
2017, New Jersey filed nearly 20,000 detention motions.239 The state has 
kept apace in 2018: from January to September 30, 2018, nearly 17,000 
detention motions were filed.240 Similarly, detention in Lucas County, 
Ohio increased after the county implemented risk assessment.241 Overall, 
even where risk assessment tools are adopted to advance explicitly 
liberal reforms, nothing inherent to risk assessment guarantees liberal 
results.242 
                                                     
235. Id. at 33. 
236. Id. at 19, 33.  
237. Judiciary Budget for Fiscal Year 2018: Hearing Before the Senate Budget and 
Appropriations Committee, 217th Leg. 4 (N.J. 2017) (remarks of J. Glenn A. Grant, Acting 
Administrative Director of the Courts), http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/ 
2017/SenateBudgetCommitteeRemarks_May_4_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/MWP9-X736].  
238. Chart A: Initial Release Decisions for Criminal Justice Reform Eligible Defendants January 
1 – December 31, 2017, supra note 210. 
239. Chart B - Supplemental Graph: Detention Motions for Criminal Justice Reform Eligible 
Defendants, Defendants Arrested in January 1 - December 31, 2017, N.J. COURTS, 
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/courts/assets/criminal/cjrreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PWV-
GVTY] (indicating that 41% of motions were granted). 
240. Chart B - Supplemental Graph: Detention Motions for Criminal Justice Reform Eligible 
Defendants, Defendants Arrested in January 1, 2018 - September 30, 2018, N.J. COURTS, 
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/cjrreport2018.pdf?cacheID=R6PoVYo 
[https://perma.cc/M69V-RZDG] (showing that 39% of motions were granted). 
241. MARIE VONNOSTRAND, LUNINOSITY, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY 
ASSESSMENT, LUCAS COUNTY, OHIO 15 (observing that nearly 6% more defendants remained in 
custody until the final disposition of their case). 
242. Consider the immigration context (which is different in significant ways but supports the 
broader point). In 2013, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deployed the Risk 
Classification Assessment (RCA) system. Mark Noferi & Robert Koulish, The Immigration 
Detention Risk Assessment, 29 GEO. IMM. L.J. 45, 48 (2014). The RCA forecast public safety and 
flight risks to help ICE officials make release or detain recommendations. Id. The purpose of the 
RCA was to “foster alternatives to detention” by ascertaining the “‘optimal pool of participants.’” 
Id. at 59–60. Notably, immigration advocates “uniformly embraced risk assessment with only 
qualified concerns.” Id. at 48. But the tool’s flight risk assessment was based on an interview with 
questions that such individuals, justifiably, might not want to answer fully or truthfully, like family, 
residency, and work authorization history. Ultimately, the RCA over-classified individuals as 
medium and high flight risks and recommended less than 1% of arrestees for release in Baltimore. 
Robert Koulish, Immigration Detention in the Risk Classification Assessment Era, 16 CONN. PUB. 
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Perhaps California’s new Senate Bill 10 is most illustrative of this 
concern: the law is rife with various detention provisions and triggers. 
For example, the statute directs the newly-established Pretrial 
Assessment Services to not release anyone assessed as high risk.243 
Regardless of a person’s risk score, if they have violated a condition of 
release in the past five years, the law commands Pretrial Assessment 
Services to not release them.244 A high risk assessment score, combined 
with one of four other factors, establishes a “rebuttable presumption that 
no condition or combination of conditions of pretrial supervision will 
reasonably assure public safety.”245 While individuals assessed as low 
risk are supposed to be released,246 whether individuals assessed as 
medium risk will be released or detained is subject to the local rules of 
each superior court.247 More broadly, the law empowers prosecutors to 
file a motion seeking prevent detention at any time if the prosecutor 
believes there is a “substantial reason to believe that no nonmonetary 
condition or combination of conditions of pretrial supervision will 
reasonably assure protection of the public or a victim.”248 Notably, 
“substantial reason” is not defined.249 Functionally, that discretion is 
essentially unlimited.250 
                                                     
INT. L.J. 1, 5 (2016). Overall, though the RCA was supposed to aid ICE in fostering alternatives to 
detention and alleviate bed shortages for detainees, it had exactly the opposite effect. See id. at 33. 
243. Act of Aug. 28, 2018, ch. 244, § 1320.10(e)(1), 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West) (S.B. 10).  
244. Id. § 1320.10(e)(11) (“Notwithstanding subdivisions (a) and (b), Pretrial Assessment 
Services shall not release . . . [a] person who has violated a condition of pretrial release within the 
past five years.”). 
245. Id. § 1320(a)(2). 
246. Id. § 1320.10(b). 
247. Id. § 1320.11(a) (stating that the “local rule may further expand the list of offenses and 
factors for which prearraignment release of persons assessed as medium risk is not permitted but 
shall not provide for the exclusion of release of all medium-risk defendants by Pretrial Assessment 
Services”). Local advocates have expressed substantial fear related to this provision. See Eric 
Westervelt, California’s Bail Overhaul May Do More Harm Than Good, Reformers Say, NPR (Oct. 
2, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/02/651959950/californias-bail-overhaul-may-do-more-harm-
than-good-reformers-say [https://perma.cc/Y6FD-C9E7] (“Local counties based on their political 
environment and based on their own tendencies around incarceration could increase the net of 
pretrial detention by simply changing the dial and saying that not only are higher risk people now 
excluded from release but we also think this broad swath we considered moderate risk would also 
be excluded from release.” (quoting Raj Jayadev, co-founder of the social and legal advocacy group 
Silicon Valley De-Bug)).  
248. Act of Aug. 28, 2018, ch. 244, § 1320.18(5), 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West) (S.B. 10).  
249. See Westervelt, supra note 247 (quoting Chesa Boudin, a public defender in San Francisco, 
who notes that “[u]nder this law prosecutors have the discretion to seek pre-emptive detention of a 
person with no criminal record charged with a low level misdemeanor”). 
250. Cf. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 12, which states that “[a] person shall be released on bail by 
sufficient sureties, except for” capital crimes, violent felonies, and felonies—where the latter two 
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In upholding the 1984 Bail Reform Act, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
wrote that, “[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to 
trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”251 Of course, this 
stated principle rings hollow when compared to today’s stark reality. 
True, an emergent consensus says that individuals should not be 
detained before trial simply because they are too poor to pay their way 
out. Yet, even in New Jersey, a pioneering state that eliminated money 
bail in favor of widespread pretrial risk assessment, nearly one-fifth of 
defendants are detained pretrial. Ultimately, reforms predicated on 
pretrial risk assessment may expand the instances in which defendants 
are preventively detained and denied bail pretrial.252 
3. Conceding Salerno 
Only a few decades ago, the constitutional propriety of predicting 
dangerousness pretrial was a matter of vociferous and widespread 
debate. Yet, oddly, a practice that was once seen as fundamentally at 
odds with the U.S. Constitution and our system of moral judgment is 
now seen as an obvious, rational component of pretrial decision-
making.253 
Though there “has been relatively little innovation in the law and 
scholarship on bail in the twenty years since Salerno,”254 the new era of 
bail reform requires such innovation. In fact, the logic of a bail reform 
model predicated on risk assessment “requires that judges have authority 
to order pretrial preventive detention.”255 But today, only twenty-two 
states, the District of Columbia, and the federal system authorize 
                                                     
offenses require other, particular findings, like “clear and convincing evidence that the person has 
threatened another with great bodily harm and that there is a substantial likelihood that the person 
would carry out the threat if released.” 
251. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1986). 
252. True, in many states before risk assessment reforms were implemented the “detention net” 
was already wide. That is, risk assessment reforms did not drive the increase in charges in which a 
prosecutor could file a preventive detention motion. But the adoption of risk assessment as a means 
of reform, like in California, shines a bright light on that wide detention net because it will be the 
only way in which the criminal justice system detains individuals pretrial—money bail will not offer 
a sub rosa means to do so.  
253. Mayson, supra note 24, at 495 (2018) (“[A]uthorities on pretrial law and policy—including 
pretrial laws themselves—now universally identify . . . protecting the public from harm at the hands 
of defendants” as a core purpose of the pretrial system). 
254. Samuel Wiseman, Discrimination, Coercion, and the Bail Reform Act of 1984: The Loss of the 
Core Constitutional Protections of the Excessive Bail Clause, FORDHAM U. L.J. 121, 123 (2009). 
255. Mayson, supra note 24, at 515. 
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preventive detention, and those only in some circumstances.256 
“[T]wenty-three states still guarantee a broad constitutional right to bail 
and [would] have to amend their constitutions to authorize preventive 
detention without bail.”257 
Actuarial tools may, in short, offer bail reformers a Faustian tradeoff: 
a new approach to pretrial justice that comes with chance (and a hope) of 
reduced incarceration, but that also ratifies recent erosions of the 
fundamental rights of the accused. This Article contends that reformers 
need to be more attentive to this trade-off. 
This question ultimately points back to Salerno, and the contested 
question of whether that case was rightly decided. In examining Salerno, 
scholars take particular issue with Salerno’s conclusion that preventive 
detention would not be punitive, and with its treatment of the risk of 
error in preventive detention decisions. 
To determine whether or not a governmental act—in this case, 
preventive pretrial detention—had punitive effect, the Salerno Court 
applied Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.258 Under that case, the first step 
was to examine the legislative history of the 1984 Bail Reform Act to 
determine if there was explicit punitive intent. According to the Court in 
Kennedy, if no punitive congressional intent is discernible, “each factor 
of the [following] test is to be weighed”259: 
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or 
restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a 
punishment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of 
scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the traditional 
aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the 
behavior to which it applied is already a crime, [6] whether an 
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is 
assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive in relation 
to the alternative purpose assigned.260 
Where “conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal 
nature of a statute” is not available, the seven factors “must be 
considered in relation to the statute on its face.”261 
                                                     
256. SUSAN KEILITZ & SARA SAPIA, NAT’L CTR. ON STATE COURTS, PREVENTIVE DETENTION 1 
(2017). 
257. Mayson, supra note 24, at 515–16.  
258. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
259. Michael J. Eason, Eighth Amendment—What Will Become of the Innocent, 78 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1048, 1061–62 (1988). 
260. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168–69 (citations omitted). 
261. Id. at 169 (emphasis added). 
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But, as Professor Jean Koh Peters argues, the two key cases upon 
which Salerno relied had already derogated from this test. In Bell v. 
Wolfish,262 the Court stated that: 
[a]bsent a showing of an express[ ] intent to punish . . . that 
determination generally will turn on “whether an alternative 
purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is 
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to 
the alternative purpose assigned [to it].” Thus, if a particular 
condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related 
to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without 
more, amount to “punishment.”263 
By narrowly interpreting Kennedy this way, “the Bell Court 
effectively amputated the first five Kennedy criteria.”264 Of utmost 
importance, according to the Bell Court, was whether or not the policy in 
question was reasonably related to a “‘legitimate state objective.’”265 
After fully quoting the Kennedy test, Justice Rehnquist “supported his 
drastic restatement of the test with neither precedent nor logic. In fact, he 
did not even acknowledge the change.”266 Schall, in turn, relied on Bell’s 
truncated version of the Kennedy criteria to find that juveniles could be 
detained before trial to prevent their commission of conduct that would 
be a crime if committed by an adult.267 
This is the foundation upon which Salerno relies. So long as a statute 
authorizing pretrial detention did not intend to be punitive, and so long 
as it could be understood as “reasonably related” to a legitimate 
governmental interest, it would not fall within the definition of 
punishment.268 
                                                     
262. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
263. Id. at 538. 
264. Jean Koh Peters, Schall v. Martin and the Transformation of Judicial Precedent, 31 B.C. L. 
REV. 641, 652 (1990). 
265. Id. 
266. Eason, supra note 259, at 1063 (emphasis added). 
267. But in doing so, the Court actually further cabined its analysis. Specifically, the Court in 
Schall only evaluated whether or not the text of the New York Family Act statute evidenced 
punitive intent, whereas the Court in Kennedy had examined legislative history that “revealed not 
only a predecessor statute that had called the measure a ‘penalty,’ but also legislative memoranda 
and floor debates replete with punitive language.” Peters, supra note 264, at 659. 
268. See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of the Interest-
Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 537 (1987) (“[T]he Court’s two-
tiered framework [in Schall] seems to mandate the conclusion not only that every scheme of adult 
pretrial detention enacted by state and federal legislatures is constitutional but that detention simply 
on the basis of test scores would be constitutional as well.”); Margaret S. Gain, The Bail Reform Act 
of 1984 and United States v. Salerno: Too Easy to Believe, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1371, 1378–84 
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Under this formulation, once the Salerno Court determined that 
Congress did not intend for pretrial detention to be a punitive restriction 
in the Bail Reform Act,269 it only needed to identify an “alternate 
purpose” for the restriction. There, the Salerno majority identified the 
prevention of danger to public safety as a “legitimate regulatory goal.”270 
The Salerno Court did not even mention the other five Kennedy 
criteria.271 Nor does the majority acknowledge, as an earlier case had 
held, that “even a clear legislative classification of a statute as ‘non-
penal’ would not alter the fundamental nature,” or effect, “of a plainly 
penal statute.”272 
Once it found that preventive pretrial detention was regulatory rather 
than punitive, the Salerno Court next applied Mathews v. Eldridge.273 
Mathews established a three-factor balancing test to determine what 
kinds of procedures are required once an individual has been deprived of 
life, liberty, or property on a regulatory basis: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, 
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.274 
Generally, when the liberty or property interest is weightier, more 
process is required. So, for example, depriving someone of their 
                                                     
(1989) (noting that so long as no congressional intent to punish could be discerned, the Court only 
needed to find an “alternate purpose” and “determine that the means chosen for implementation 
were not excessive in relation to that purpose”).  
269. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987). 
270. Id. 
271. M. Gray Styers, Jr., United States v. Salerno: Pretrial Detention Seen Through the Looking 
Glass, 66 N.C. L. REV. 616, 626 (1988).  
272. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95 (1958). In other contexts, the Court has distinguished 
between what Congress calls an action and the effect of that action. See, e.g., United States v. 
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294 (1935) (“But even though the statute was not adopted to penalize 
violations of the amendment, it ceased to be enforceable at the date of repeal if, in fact, its purpose 
is to punish, rather than to tax.”); United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931) (“No mere 
exercise of the art of lexicography can alter the essential nature of an act or a thing; and if an 
exaction be clearly a penalty it cannot be converted into a tax by the simple expedient of calling it 
such.”); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 561–62 (1922) (“When, by its very nature the imposition is 
a penalty, it must be so regarded.”); Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 613 (1903) (“[T]he use 
of those words does not change the nature and character of the enactment.”). 
273. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
274. Id. at 335. 
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fundamental interest in freedom from detention would require 
substantial process.275 
But here again, Peters argues, an earlier case had distorted the 
relevant precedent and set the stage for Salerno to disregard that 
precedent. Schall had ignored the first part of Mathews’s second factor, 
risk of error, “by focusing not upon the question of whether a prediction 
can be accurate, but rather upon the far more simplistic question of 
whether the prediction can be made or ‘attain[ed].’”276 To the extent that 
the Schall majority confronted how predictions of future criminal 
conduct are made, the Court recognized that “prediction of future 
criminal conduct is ‘an experienced prediction based on a host of 
variables’ which cannot be readily codified . . . . The decision is based 
on as much information as can reasonably be obtained at the initial 
appearance.”277 As Peters argued, if the Salerno Court were forced to 
apply Mathews’s second criterion, “it would have been obliged to 
evaluate not whether any detention are justified, but rather whether the 
risk of erroneous detentions would be unacceptable.”278 
But the Salerno Court did not do so. Following the Schall majority’s 
lead, the Salerno Court’s analysis was largely framed as a two-pronged 
balancing process: society’s interest, on the one hand, to prevent crime, 
and the individual’s interest, on the other, in their liberty.279 The Salerno 
Court neither “acknowledged nor discussed the [second] 
Mathews . . . criteria, the risk of error in current procedure and the 
probable value of additional or substitute procedures, respectively.”280 
To the extent the Salerno Court even referenced the procedures of the 
Bail Reform Act, it simply recited provisions of the Act, but did not 
                                                     
275. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (“The Mathews calculus then contemplates a 
judicious balancing of these concerns, through an analysis of ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation’ 
of the private interest if the process were reduced and the ‘probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute safeguards.’” (citation omitted)). 
276. Peters, supra note 264, at 677.  
277. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 279 (1984). 
278. Peters, supra note 264, at 690 (emphasis omitted).  
279. Jack F. Williams, Process and Prediction: A Return to a Fuzzy Model of Pretrial Detention, 
79 MINN. L. REV. 325, 363 (1994) (“Again, the Court exhaustively considered treatment of the 
government’s interests while only begrudgingly recognizing an adult individual’s interest to be free 
from governmental restraint. Rhetorically, to mask the basis of the decision, the losing interest 
ought to receive more time than the winning one. In Salerno, this rhetoric is not the case.”); see also 
Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Detention and the Failure of the Interest-Balancing Approaches to 
Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 511 n.1 (1986) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s current approach to 
the due process clause has tilted too far toward interest balancing and too far from historic concepts 
of individual freedom.”). 
280. Peters, supra note 264, at 686.  
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examine whether “additional or substitute” procedures held any probable 
value.281 Without any citation, the Court proclaimed that “the procedures 
by which a judicial officer evaluates the likelihood of future 
dangerousness [under the Bail Reform Act] are specifically designed to 
further the accuracy of that determination.”282 
Worse, whatever one thinks of the safeguards that the Bail Reform 
Act of 1984 provides, they are irrelevant when examining the “‘probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguard,’ if indeed 
no procedures, no matter how intricate, could ever make the procedure 
more accurate.”283 By ignoring the second part of the Mathews test, the 
Salerno Court avoided squarely addressing whether or not predictions of 
dangerousness could ever be tolerably accurate.284 
Of course, since Salerno, the Supreme Court “reversed course” on the 
application of Mathews in matters of state criminal procedures.285 In 
Medina v. California,286 the Court held that “a state rule of criminal 
procedure not governed by a specific rule set out in the Bill of Rights 
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only if it 
offends a fundamental and deeply rooted principle of justice.”287 
Whether Mathews’s balancing test applies, or Medina’s “principle of 
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience”288 standard applies, the 
accuracy of a prediction of future danger should be core to a due process 
analysis.289 That’s especially true for a pretrial justice system based on a 
risk assessment tool. The risk of a pretrial risk assessment tool 
mislabeling someone as risky based on old and otherwise non-
representative data—and thus keeps them in jail for longer, or makes it 
more likely that they will commit crimes in the future—raises significant 
issues under Mathews or Medina. 
                                                     
281. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
282. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987).  
283. Peters, supra note 264, at 690 (emphasis added). 
284. Charles P. Ewing, Schall v. Martin: Preventive Detention and Dangerousness Through the 
Looking Glass, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 173 (1985) (arguing that, based on a survey of the literature, 
predictions of violent and criminal behavior are wrong more often than they are right). 
285. Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL. REV. 1, 15 (2006). 
286. 505 U.S. 437 (1992). 
287. Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1258 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring). 
288. Medina, 505 U.S. at 445 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)). 
289. Under Mathews the relative accuracy of a risk assessment—as compared to another risk 
assessment, or other procedures—is of significant importance. Under Medina, the “fundamental and 
deeply rooted principle of justice” is presumption of innocence. Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1258. There, 
what matters is the process by which that presumption is rebutted. See id. at 1255 (“‘[A]xiomatic 
and elementary,’ the presumption of innocence ‘lies at the foundation of our criminal law.’” 
(quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895))). 
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Further, if a bail system centered on pretrial risk assessment does, in 
some instances, lead to a higher incidence of preventive detention, it is 
all the more urgent for reformers to squarely address whether or not 
Salerno was rightly decided. 
Even if one were to agree with the core holdings of Salerno—that the 
Constitution does not provide an affirmative right to bail and does not 
definitively prohibit preventative detention—several pressing questions 
remain open and underexplored. First, Salerno said nothing about “what 
degree of risk it thought constitutionally sufficient to justify 
detention.”290 That question is perhaps “the most important [element] of 
risk assessment . . . because it marks the compromise between the 
presumption of innocence, decarceration, and public safety.”291 
If it were determined that judges or pretrial risk assessment tools 
cannot predict dangerousness with adequate reliability, “pretrial 
detention [might] not be rationally related to the goal of reducing pretrial 
crime.”292 Finally, Salerno dictates that “detention prior to trial . . . is the 
carefully limited exception.”293 A risk-based bail system seemingly 
requires some defendants to be detained, without ever having been 
offered a path of release. But how many such cases are allowable until it 
can be no longer be said that detention is the “carefully limited 
exception?”  
Of course, risk assessment tools themselves cannot “answer [the] 
normative question at the heart of contemporary pretrial justice . . . how 
certain must we be that the person will commit a crime or not appear in 
court?”294 Instead, bail reform predicated on risk assessment means that 
answers to this question are all the more urgent and necessary.295 
                                                     
290. Mayson, supra note 24, at 498.  
291. Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal Sentencing, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1145 (2018). 
292. Eason, supra note 259, at 1065.  
293. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
294. Note, supra note 291, at 1145. 
295. Here, Sandra Mayson’s recent work deserves special note. Mayson argues that 
[T]here is no clear, relevant distinction between defendants and non-defendants who are 
equally dangerous . . . there is no constitutional text or doctrine that clearly grants the state 
more expansive preventive authority over defendants than non-defendants. . . . [Further], the 
practical justifications proffered to support the special preventive restraint of defendants are, at 
best, incomplete. 
Mayson, supra note 24, at 499. Given that there is no moral or practical distinction, and like cases 
should be treated similarly, Mayson develops a “parity principle,” which “holds that the state has no 
greater authority to preventively restrain a defendant than it does a non-defendant who poses an 
equal risk.” Id. Overall, Mayson argues “[g]iven the trajectory of pretrial reform, it is both an 
important and an opportune time to clarify the contours of the state’s pretrial powers.” Id. at 500. 
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IV. ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES 
A. Pretrial Reform Without Risk Assessment 
Although pretrial risk assessments are often described as a necessary 
or natural focus for bail reform efforts, this focus is misplaced. 
Considering the arguments detailed above, and on the basis of the 
preliminary evidence currently available, it is not safe to assume that 
pretrial risk assessment instruments will help to reduce today’s 
widespread overuse of pretrial incarceration, or to mitigate the 
longstanding racial disparities in pretrial justice.296 
Other policy changes may more effectively and immediately serve the 
goals of decarceration and fairness in pretrial justice. These other steps 
include: 
 
Automatic release of broad categories of defendants: As detailed 
above, defendants appear to be best able to succeed on release when they 
avoid any period at all of pretrial incarceration. Policies that provide for 
the summary, automatic release on recognizance of defendants charged 
with certain crimes, such as for example all defendants whose most 
serious charge is a misdemeanor, could help to ensure that large numbers 
of defendants are positioned to avoid pretrial incarceration and its 
harmful effects. 
High procedural burdens for imposing pretrial detention or 
supervisory conditions: In New Jersey, for example, one major focus of 
reform efforts has been to encourage litigation of pretrial release 
decisions by requiring robust pretrial detention hearings.297 Practitioners 
report that these heightened evidentiary standards have played a central 
role in reducing the use of pretrial incarceration. 
                                                     
296. Our suggestions here largely accord with the recommendations of more than 100 civil rights, 
digital rights, and community-based groups, who argue that “[r]eal reform addresses underlying 
structural inequalities, rather than attempting to triage a structurally flawed system. Jurisdictions 
can—and should—abolish systems of monetary bail, combat mass incarceration, make meaningful 
investments in communities, and pursue pretrial fairness and justice without adopting such tools.” 
See LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE SHARED STATEMENT, supra note 124, at 2. Through our work at 
Upturn, we played a research and advisory role in the development of this statement. 
297. For example, New Jersey Court Rule 3:4-2(c) requires the prosecution to turn over any 
available preliminary incident reports, affidavits of probable cause, “all statements or reports 
relating to the affidavit of probable cause, . . . all statements or reports relating to additional 
evidence the State relies on to establish probable cause at the hearing,” statements related to 
community safety when determining whether to release the defendant, and all exculpatory evidence. 
N.J. CT. R. 3:4-2(c)(2). But see State v. Dickerson, 177 A.3d 788 (2018) (limiting the discovery the 
state must automatically make available to defendants facing a pretrial detention hearing).  
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Text message reminders and other supportive pretrial services: 
Accused people are more likely to succeed upon release if they are 
reminded of upcoming court dates. Reminders should be a standard 
practice for all those released. Other services designed to support 
success, such as transportation assistance for people who may need help 
getting to court, can likewise make success on release more likely and 
thus make release more attractive. 
Front-end reforms that address excessive and racially disparate 
charging patterns: Policing changes, such as issuing citations in lieu of 
arrest, as well as investments in non-police responses to public safety 
problems, may help to reduce the number of people who face criminal 
charges in the first place, and to reduce racial disparities in the pretrial 
population. Similarly, electoral efforts that support the election of 
progressive prosecutors can help create a world of more measured 
prosecutorial decision-making and hence less incarceration. 
 
We do not believe that the above steps should be seen as flawless or 
guaranteed solutions to the deeply rooted injustices of today’s bail 
system. In fact, such steps can at times have paradoxical or unintended 
consequences, no less than other social policies.298 However, these steps 
do speak directly to the challenge of pretrial incarceration, and we 
believe it would be reasonable for advocates and reform-minded system 
actors to shift their change-making efforts to focus on steps like these. 
B. Where Risk Assessment Is Used: Relevant, Timely Data 
1. Risk Assessment Tools Should Always Rely on Recent, Local Data 
Jurisdictions that are reforming bail practices should always rely on 
recent data, gathered after their other pretrial reforms have taken root, to 
construct or calibrate their risk assessment tools. Existing “off the shelf” 
risk assessment tools, whose predictions assume that defendants still 
face the same long odds of succeeding outside jail, should not be used 
without adjustment in jurisdictions where those risks have been 
                                                     
298. For example, Maryland Court Rule 4-216.1—which says that judges may not impose a 
financial condition of release if that condition would lead to the person’s pretrial detention—is on 
its face a progressive policy that should help ensure fewer people are detained pretrial. MA. CT. R. 
4-216.1. However, that policy has had its own unintended consequences. While 6% more 
defendants have been released on their own recognizance, nearly 12% more defendants were held 
without bail. Data suggests that, “in the absence of [pretrial service] options, many judges are opting 
to hold defendants in jail pretrial rather than release them on their own recognizance.” See 
BLUMAUER ET AL., supra note 232, at 14.  
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mitigated. Risk assessment tools developed solely from historical data 
that predates the enactment of significant risk-mitigating reforms will 
not reflect defendants’ new odds of success on release and could, in turn, 
hamper overall reform efforts. 
What counts as “recent data” will vary, depending on context. For 
example, a jurisdiction’s decision to move from a money bail schedule 
to a system that presumptively releases all misdemeanor defendants 
would be a major risk mitigating reform, and no risk assessment 
instrument should be used unless it can reflects the outcomes of a 
presumptive-release regime. What’s ultimately important is for 
jurisdictions to track changing patterns of risks and outcomes. 
Recent data is indispensable, but earlier data can potentially be 
responsibly used, given certain conditions. The critical concept is that 
the scoring process must evolve to reflect declining risks of pretrial 
failure. Models based partly on older data can be adjusted to reflect more 
recent developments. Adjustment is possible because the defendants 
who get released are themselves a diverse group, with different (albeit 
low) levels of failure risk, and their outcomes can be compared both 
before and after reforms. If released defendants are grouped by the risk 
score they were assigned at arraignment, so that there are separate 
groups of released defendants who earned scores of 1, 2, and 3 out of ten 
(say), the groups should each have different—presumably increasing—
rates of pretrial failure. Those rates can be compared both before and 
after a reform to assess how scores may need to be adjusted. 
A regression that compared the failure rates of these before and after 
reform could reveal by how much, and for which offenders, risks have 
now been reduced. A regression linking scored risk level to post-reform 
failure rate can reveal when a jurisdiction has succeeded in reducing the 
actual level of risk associated with each score. The jurisdiction can then 
either recalibrate the risk scale or simply begin to release more 
defendants at the higher score levels (which have come to betoken a 
lower true level of risk than they did initially). 
Ultimately, if jurisdictions are to truly rely on and promote “evidence-
based practices,” they must gather the evidence first. For a pretrial risk 
assessment tool to promote evidence-based practice, the tool must 
incorporate recent data that reflects the fact that bail reform policies 
have mitigated the risks defendants face once released. If jurisdictions 
cannot, or will not, wait for fresh data to introduce risk assessment, then 
they must vigorously collect data on the failure rates of defendants 
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before and after reform.299 This would empower policymakers to update 
the model early on and, once they do so, they should weigh the recency 
of post-reform data higher within the model. 
2. Regularly Compare Predictions Against Outcomes 
It is vitally important that jurisdictions track risk scores and 
subsequent outcomes.300 This may seem like a simple or obvious 
suggestion, but current practice lags woefully far behind it. Data 
collection practices on pretrial outcomes at the county level are 
notoriously varied, often haphazard, and sometimes totally absent.301 
Some agencies do not or cannot calculate failure to appear rates or 
pretrial rearrest rates.302 Even more basic information, like the average 
length of jail stay for detained pretrial defendants, is sometimes 
                                                     
299. We expand on the benefits of vigorous pretrial outcome data collection in the next section. 
300. Stevenson, supra note 126, at 59 (“When a new technique is adopted, outcomes should be 
monitored to see if the desired effects were achieved. If they were not, adjustments can be made 
accordingly. In this paradigm, a method would be neither championed nor pilloried until its impacts 
in practice are clearly understood.”). 
301. A 2014 report by the Governor’s Commission to Reform Maryland’s Pretrial System 
identified the following gaps in available data about Maryland’s pretrial population, which it labeled 
“Unanswered Questions”:  
How many defendants post bond? How many defendants are released on pretrial supervision? 
How many defendants released pretrial are arrested prior to trial? Of those defendants on 
pretrial supervision, how many fail to appear for court or get arrested prior to trial? What is the 
risk level of each defendant detained pretrial in jail? How many pretrial defendants are 
detained in jail who could not post bond? What was the bond amount? What is the average 
length of stay of pretrial defendants detained in jail? 
COMM’N TO REFORM MD’S PRETRIAL SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT 15 (2014), 
http://goccp.maryland.gov/pretrial/documents/2014-pretrial-commission-final-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U37Z-8SAM]. 
302. See, e.g., OHIO CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N, AD HOC COMM. ON BAIL & PRETRIAL 
SERVS., FINAL REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS 18 (2017), 
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/Sentencing/Materials/2017/March/finalAdHocBailRepo
rt.pdf [https://perma.cc/JSY4-TJVZ] (“As in other areas of Ohio’s criminal justice system, data 
regarding pretrial decisions, agencies, and outcomes is rarely collected. Less than 20% of 
respondents to the Ad Hoc survey collect data on failure to appear rates and even less are collecting 
data regarding arrests for crimes committed while on release pretrial. The Ad Hoc Committee 
recommends a dedicated and concerted effort to increase data collection and analysis for all facets 
of the bail and pretrial system in Ohio. At a minimum, the committee recommends that collection of 
appearance rates, safety rates, and concurrence rates (how often a judge accepts a pretrial service 
agency recommendation) be mandated for each jurisdiction.”). Four of fifty-six programs with 
survey responses in Ohio said they calculate failure to appear rates; zero of fifty-six programs with 
survey responses said they calculate pretrial rearrest rates, and two of fifty-six calculate release 
rates. Id. at 247, 251, 253. 
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unavailable or not tracked.303 Others alter the very pretrial failure rates 
they seek to measure through technological errors.304 
Data on the risk scores and subsequent outcomes, whether for all 
defendants or for a representative sample of them, is necessary in order 
to understand the relationship between scores and true levels of risk. 
Without such data, there is no way to know whether the risk assessment 
data is systematically wrong about the risks posed by defendants. Such 
regular monitoring would not only allow jurisdictions to evaluate how 
well their risk assessment tool classifies risk, but also empower 
jurisdictions to track how reform efforts may be changing risk levels. It 
is also important for a defendant’s risk assessment prediction, their 
subsequent outcome, and case file to be linked. This would make it 
possible to analyze how predictions or outcomes correlate with other 
features, such as a defendant’s race, socioeconomic status, recent 
rearrests, or type of pretrial monitoring. Doing so would help ensure that 
risk assessment tools lead to more equitable outcomes across race, 
gender, and socioeconomic status.305 
Such tracking should also include data on how often judges concur 
with the risk assessment tool’s recommendations, and ideally on their 
reasons for diverging when they do. By tracking concurrence, 
divergence, and why a judge diverged, policymakers may be able to 
create a positive feedback loop. The more that judges understand how a 
risk assessment tool works, and the more that the developers of a risk 
assessment tool understand how judges use—or do not use—their tool, 
the better. 
Further, validation studies should not stand in the way of continuous 
monitoring. Pretrial risk assessment validation studies take time simply 
because criminal cases themselves take a long time to resolve. In order 
for an entire six-month period of risk assessment predictions to be 
analyzed, one must observe each case until disposition. Such observation 
                                                     
303. Id. at 88, 94–95. 
304. In Harris County, newly approved court rules schedule many hearings for within one 
business day. The county’s computer system, however, still tells misdemeanor defendants to return 
to court in seven days. Misinformed defendants are missing their court dates, which may make the 
otherwise successful reform look like a failure. See Bryce Covert, Are Harris County Officials 
Trying to “Sabotage” Bail Reform with Misleading Data?, MEDIUM: IN JUST. TODAY (Dec. 8, 
2017), https://medium.com/in-justice-today/advocates-say-harris-county-officials-are-trying-to-
sabotage-bail-reform-with-misleading-data-81a1292edca1 [https://perma.cc/6VP8-8SYQ]. 
305.  More than 100 civil rights groups recently called for similar requirements, demanding that 
revalidation of risk assessment tools check for predictive validity and differences across race, 
gender, and other protected characteristics. See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE SHARED 
STATEMENT, supra note 123, at 8–9. 
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may last a year and a half, or longer. Accordingly, jurisdictions must 
resist the temptation to blind themselves from viewing pretrial outcome 
data until each case is resolved. Monthly reporting—though offering an 
incomplete view—can still provide valuable insight. Overall, validation 
studies and continuous monitoring need not stand in each other’s way.306 
Many jurisdictions may lack the technological infrastructure, 
expertise, and other resources to pay attention to whether their pretrial 
risk assessments are right or wrong. Such challenges, where they exist, 
must not be considered a warrant to ignore the question. To the extent 
policymakers imagine that they can combine bad data with good 
prediction, a shift in perspective is essential. Data infrastructure is not an 
afterthought, but an indispensable pillar of the responsible deployment 
of statistical predictions in pretrial justice.307 
3. Focus on the Risks that Matter Most 
Pretrial risk assessment tools generally forecast two outcomes: failure 
to appear and rearrest. It is important to interrogate the gap between the 
data jurisdictions have and the questions jurisdictions ask of that data.308 
Currently, forty-five states and the District of Columbia permit either 
pretrial detention or release subject to restrictions “[a]fter a finding that a 
defendant poses a danger to an individual or community.”309 However, 
most of today’s risk assessment tools only predict future rearrest. As 
others have observed, the two are not the same. While rearrest for a 
violent crime might signal danger to an individual or community, 
rearrest writ large does not. Correlates of rearrest do not so much 
measure “dangerousness” as they measure—and anticipate—future 
contact with the criminal justice system.310 
                                                     
306. Civil rights advocates called for validation to occur “annually at the least, with the ideal 
being quarterly.” Id. at 9.  
307. See, e.g., ERIKA PARKS ET AL., URBAN INST., LOCAL JUSTICE REINVESTMENT 12 (2016) (“A 
critical component of justice reinvestment is data analysis and data-driven decision-making . . . . To 
improve data capacity, local sites developed data warehouses, integrated data systems, data 
dashboards, and jail population and cost-benefit projection tools.”). 
308. See LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS, SIX THINGS TO KNOW 
ABOUT ALGORITHM-BASED DECISION-MAKING TOOLS 1 (2018), 
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/criminal-justice/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-6Things.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LGB4-UP45] (“‘[R]isk scores’ from algorithmic risk assessment tools have little 
bearing on the risks that really matter to communities.”). 
309. Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 62, at 512. 
310. DELBERT S. ELLIOTT, CTR. FOR THE STUDY & PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, LIES, DAMN LIES 
AND ARREST STATISTICS 11 (1995), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.182. 
9427&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/6L6U-4BZ2]. 
08 - Koepke & Robinson (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 12/28/2018  4:27 PM 
1798 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1725 
 
For example, most rearrests pretrial appear to be for technical 
violations, not new felonies or violent crimes.311 Federal data from 
2012–2014 show that for defendants released to the community pretrial 
who had at least one violation while on release, technical violations of 
bail conditions represented the vast majority of all violations in which a 
new offense was charged.312 Between 2008 and 2010, 90% of all pretrial 
violations by federal defendants released were technical violations.313 
The technical conditions of bail are often mundane: curfews, travel 
restrictions, drug tests, and even keep-your-job requirements. 
Other bail reforms will make it all the more important to delineate 
technical violations from new violent arrests. Jurisdictions will likely 
release more defendants pretrial by increasing the use of non-financial 
conditions of release.314 In all likelihood, this will increase the incidence 
of rearrest for technical violation of release conditions. 
Ultimately, communities should determine which public safety risks 
matter most to them, and researchers, practitioners, and policymakers 
should act accordingly. Should decisions be based on “the risk of the 
defendant committing another crime pretrial or the risk of the defendant 
committing specific crimes pretrial (e.g., violent offences)?”315 And 
                                                     
311. A “technical violation” of conditional release, benign as it may sound, can also carry serious 
and immediate consequences (beyond making the person appear riskier in future risk assessments). 
The American Bar Association’s Pretrial Release General Principles say that a “person who has 
been released on conditions and who has violated a condition of release, including willfully failing 
to appear in court, should be subject to a warrant for arrest, modification of release conditions, 
revocation of release, or an order of detention, or prosecution on available criminal charges.” ABA, 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 19 (3d ed. 2006). 
312. MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2012 - 
STATISTICAL TABLES 15 tbl.3.3 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs12st.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RH6N-KQ79]; MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, 2013 - STATISTICAL TABLES 15 tbl.3.3 (2017), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs13st.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8QZ-XDPM]; MARK 
MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2014 - STATISTICAL TABLES 15 
tbl.3.3 (2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs14st.pdf [https://perma.cc/38MP-7PJK]. 
313. THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL RELEASE AND MISCONDUCT IN 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, 2008–2010, at 1 (2012), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prmfdc0810.pdf [https://perma.cc/37CH-XDDT]. 
314. That is at least already an observable trend in federal-level data—80% of defendants 
released on personal recognizance received some set of pretrial conditions, while only 40% of 
defendants with a surety bond release received pretrial conditions. Id. at 9; see also SANTA CRUZ 
CTY. PROB. DEP’T, ALTERNATIVES TO CUSTODY REPORT 2015 (2016) (detailing a decrease in the 
ADP in the first half of the year, followed by a modest increase in the next half). But see id. at 11 
(“[F]ollowing modifications of the PSA-Court decision making framework, in the first quarter of 
CY2016 saw a dramatic rise of the [Average Daily Population on pretrial supervision]—almost 
double of previous years.”). 
315. MAMALIAN, supra note 132, at 13. 
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though developers of risk assessment tools sometimes concede that 
rearrest data is an imperfect measure, they generally defend it as the one 
of the few measures available—or, the least bad option available. But 
distinguishing new violent crimes from technical violations is a bare 
minimum requirement for responsible use of these tools. Similar 
critiques can be made about failure to appear data. While data on failure 
to appear does not suffer from sampling bias,316 the reasons defendants 
fail to appear vary widely and should not be construed to suggest flight 
risk. Thus, generalized failure to appear data flattens the underlying 
circumstances. 
How might jurisdictions interrogate the gap between the data 
jurisdictions have and the questions jurisdictions ask of that data? As a 
start, jurisdictions should demand aggregate-level reporting of the 
development sample or training data for any pretrial risk assessment 
tool. Such a report should at least disclose: the breakdown of rearrests by 
charge, severity of charge, age, race, and gender. Failures to appear 
should also be explained on some metric, like whether the failures are 
persistent or sporadic. Such a report might tell policymakers that there is 
a significant gap between the data upon which a risk assessment tool is 
based and the questions that truly matter to them. Or it might not. Either 
way, such information is critical for jurisdictions to make an informed 
decision on whether or not to adopt a risk assessment tool. 
Moreover, the risks that matter most might not just be the risks of a 
defendant’s rearrest or failure to appear. As Crystal Yang recently 
argued, jurisdictions could also consider the risks that pretrial detention 
might worsen a defendant’s circumstances.317 In imagining a “net-
benefit” assessment, Yang argues that risk assessment tools could be 
used to “maximize social welfare in the bail setting [by] . . . also us[ing] 
data to predict the likelihood of harms associated with detention.”318 
Given the emergent literature on the staggering downstream costs of 
pretrial detention, such a concept is more than worthy of future 
research.319 
                                                     
316. That is to say, a person either did or did not show up to a court date or hearing. A court does 
not only observe a select class of failures to appear.  
317. Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1488 (2017).  
318. Id. (“For example, data on detained defendants can be used to identify factors that are most 
predictive of agreed-upon harms: whether someone is wrongfully convicted, whether someone loses 
their home, whether someone is unable to find employment in the formal labor market, and whether 
someone commits crime in the future.”). 
319. Id. at 1489–90. Though Yang does not advocate for the practicality of her suggestion, she 
does note that “[u]ltimately, by using data to predict both the costs and benefits of pre-trial detention 
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C. Where Risk Assessment Is Used: Strong, Inclusive Governance 
1. Risk Assessments and Frameworks Should Not Recommend 
Detention 
For the strongest chance at reducing incarceration—and in order to 
keep preventive detention within constitutional limits—policymakers 
must ensure that risk assessment instruments and their associated 
decision-making frameworks do not supplant the adversary hearing and 
specific findings of fact that are constitutionally necessary before a 
defendant can be preventively detained. Finding that the defendant is a 
member of a collectively high risk group is the most specific observation 
that risk assessment instruments can make about any person. And such a 
finding does not answer, or even address, the question of whether 
preventive detention is the only way to reasonably assure that person’s 
reappearance or the preservation of public safety. That question must be 
asked specifically about the individual whose liberty is at stake—and it 
must be answered in the affirmative in order for detention to be 
constitutionally justifiable. 
In practical terms, this means that a responsible and well-governed 
risk assessment instrument will never go so far as to propose detention 
or suggest that the defendant not be released. Instead, for those deemed 
highest risk, the decisonmaking framework can and should propose that 
a hearing be conducted to assess what combination of conditions can 
reasonably assure the reappearance of the accused and public safety. It is 
the role of the judge or magistrate at such a hearing—not the role of a 
risk assessment instrument—to decide whether the defendant should be 
detained. 
In addition to being prudent policy, our recommendation on this point 
is also essential as a matter of statistical practice. Today’s risk 
assessment instruments make no attempt to measure the change in risk 
that is caused by the supportive services or supervisory conditions that a 
judge may impose in a particular case. And yet, it is precisely this 
modified level of risk that the judge must assess as the basis for a 
detention decision. (Another term for this change is the “responsiveness” 
of the defendant, as noted above in our discussion of risk assessment 
frameworks.) No risk assessment score and no decision-making 
recommendation should in and of itself trump a person’s presumption of 
release. Likewise, such scores should never serve as prima facie 
                                                     
for each defendant, jurisdictions could create ‘net-benefit’ assessment tools using largely the same 
set-up already employed for risk-assessment tools.” Id. at 1490. 
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evidence that no condition of release would assure someone’s 
appearance or public safety.320 After all, responsiveness to conditions is 
not something these tools measure. 
This recommendation is broadly endorsed: Civil rights groups have 
made this point directly,321 and so too have the largest proponents 
assessment tools. For example, in new materials, the Arnold Foundation 
instructs that the decision-making framework—what it calls a “release 
conditions matrix”—should not include detention among its 
recommendations 322 Instead,  
If the judicial officer determines that a person is eligible for 
detention . . . under state law, the officer must hold a hearing in 
order to lawfully detain the person pretrial. [Such hearings must] 
adhere to certain fundamental legal foundations for detention, 
most of which are articulated in United States v. Salerno.323 
The foundation “encourages [jurisdictions] to understand the law in 
order to use the PSA in the most legally sound manner; this necessarily 
includes holding a due process hearing prior to intentional pretrial 
detention.”324 We emphatically join in that particular piece of advice. 
2. Risk Assessments and Frameworks Must Be Public 
Risk assessment models used in the courtroom pretrial—and the 
process used to develop and test them—must be public. Of course, 
making public the risk assessment models and the process used to 
develop and test them would do much to alleviate due process concerns. 
Risk assessment tools that rely on trade secret claims, like Equivant’s 
COMPAS risk assessment tool, have already seen due process 
challenges. But it is not just defendants who fear what may be happening 
behind the curtain of trade secrecy. Judges may also be wary. 
                                                     
320. The recent State v. Mercedes decision in New Jersey supports this view. See State v. 
Mercedes, 183 A.3d 914, 931 (N.J. 2018) (Albin, J., concurring) (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2018) (“The pretrial 
services recommendation, through the court rule, could have operated to undermine the rebuttable 
presumption favoring pretrial release.”). 
321. See LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE SHARED STATEMENT, supra note 124. 
322. GUIDE TO THE RELEASE CONDITIONS MATRIX, supra note 217, at 1–2 (“On its own, the PSA 
does not direct a judicial officer to release or detain a person or recommend a presumptive level of 
pretrial release (or its associated conditions) . . . . Detention is not included in the matrix because 
eligibility for detention is based on state law, and the matrix becomes relevant only after a judicial 
officer decides a person will be released.”). 
323. LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT IMPLEMENTATION GUIDES: 
8. GUIDE TO THE PRETRIAL DECISION FRAMEWORK 10, https://www.psapretrial.org/implementation 
/guides/managing-risk/guide-to-the-pretrial-decision-framework (last visited Nov. 6, 2018). 
324. Id. 
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For example, in State v. Loomis,325 the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
became the first court to address the relationship between trade secrets in 
risk assessments and due process principles in sentencing. Although the 
Court ultimately rejected Loomis’ due process claim, one Justice noted 
in a concurrence that “this court’s lack of understanding of COMPAS 
was a significant problem in the instant case. At oral argument, the court 
repeatedly questioned both the State’s and defendant’s counsel about 
how COMPAS works. Few answers were available.”326 
Though Loomis involved the use of a risk assessment tool’s findings 
at sentencing, the same problems apply pretrial. Early evidence suggests 
that judges diverge from the recommendations of risk assessment tools 
at rates that should concern reformers and policymakers alike.327 One 
way to ensure that judicial concurrence rates with risk assessment 
recommendations stay high is to ensure that judges are involved from 
the outset with the development, design, and testing of a new pretrial 
risk assessment system. A criminal justice system that is better 
understood and debated by all stakeholders will not only enjoy greater 
public support, but also enjoy greater legitimacy from all of those actors. 
Higher perceptions of legitimacy when it comes to pretrial risk 
assessment likely means higher concurrence rates. 
Algorithmic trade secrecy is just one problem, however. For example, 
the PSA is a fairly simple system that can be implemented without a 
                                                     
325. 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016). 
326. Id. at 774 (Wis. 2016) (Abrahamson, J., concurring). 
327. Early evidence indicates a high rate of judicial overrides, in which judges depart from the 
recommendations of a risk assessment tool. A report by the Cook County sheriff’s office reportedly 
found that Cook County judges diverged from the recommendations of their risk assessment tool 
more than 80% of the time. See Frank Main, Cook County Judges Not Following Bail 
Recommendations: Study, CHI. SUN-TIMES (July 3, 2016), https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/cook-
county-judges-not-following-bail-recommendations-study-find/ [https://perma.cc/U8Y8-GNCK]; 
see also Stevenson, supra note 126, at 17–36. 
Other evidence suggests that these diversions are not randomly distributed. HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, “NOT IN IT FOR JUSTICE”: HOW CALIFORNIA’S PRETRIAL DETENTION AND BAIL SYSTEM 
UNFAIRLY PUNISHES POOR PEOPLE 93 (2017) (“[J]udges disregard release recommendations, 
setting bail for as much as 75 percent of all defendants determined to be ‘low risk.’”); SANTA CRUZ 
CTY. PROB. DEP’T, supra note 314, at 2, 8. Santa Cruz County piloted PSA-Court from July 2014 to 
June 2015. During 2015, the Superior County Court considered 1,437 recommendations. Id. Six 
hundred and forty-four PSA-Court recommendations were for release and 793 were for detention. 
Judges departed from the release recommendations a little more than half of the time—53% of the 
time—but only departed from detain recommendations 16% of the time. Most of the departures, in 
other words, were in the direction of greater detention. Id. Cf. MATTHEW DEMICHELE ET AL., WHAT 
DO CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONALS THINK ABOUT RISK ASSESSMENT AT PRETRIAL? 33 tbl.5 
(noting that in a survey of criminal justice actors, all judges responded that they “often” or 
“sometimes” agree with the PSA recommendation and the vast majority of judges said that the PSA 
informed their release/bail decisions). 
08 - Koepke & Robinson (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 12/28/2018  4:27 PM 
2018] RISK ASSESSMENT AND THE FUTURE OF BAIL REFORM 1803 
 
computer. And it appears that the Arnold Foundation is benevolently 
motivated—it provides the system free of charge. But, today, there is 
still a substantial amount that’s unknown about PSA. As Robert 
Brauneis and Ellen Goodman recently observed, the Arnold Foundation 
has not revealed how it developed its algorithms, why it used the data it 
chose to develop the system, whether it performed validation, and, if it 
did, what the outcomes were.328 Nor has it disclosed, in quantitative 
terms, what “low risk” and “high risk” meant. 
In order to see if court systems had this information, Brauneis and 
Goodman sent open records requests to sixteen different courts, only to 
largely be stymied.329 Of the five courts that responded to their request 
by providing documents, four of them “stated that they could not provide 
information about PSA because that information was owned and 
controlled by the Arnold Foundation,” thanks to a Memorandum of 
Understanding “which contained identical language prohibiting the 
courts from disclosing any information about the PSA program.”330 Such 
contractual confidentiality requirements may have some benefits. But 
such confidentiality can also be detrimental and worsen perceptions of 
procedural legitimacy. 
Definitions of input data and outcome measures must also be public. 
By this we mean that designers should disclose precisely what a tool 
attempts to predict, and for what time period, based on what inputs. 
For example, one of the input factors that the PSA uses to calculate a 
defendant’s risk of rearrest (as well as the more specific risk of rearrest 
for violent crimes) is whether the defendant has been previously 
convicted of a “violent” crime.331 The specific crimes that can be 
prosecuted vary from one jurisdiction to another. Thus, in order to 
produce a PSA score, a jurisdiction must decide which of the specific 
charges in its local laws will be counted as “violent” crimes during 
scoring—by creating what the Arnold Foundation calls a Violent 
Offense List.332 This process is supposed to consist of the jurisdiction 
                                                     
328. Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, 20 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 138 (2018). 
329. Id. 
330. Id. at 138–39. 
331. See LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT: RISK FACTORS AND 
FORMULA 2 (2016), https://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/PSA-Risk-Factors-and-
Formula.pdf [https://perma.cc/UNG8-U7C8]. 
332. LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT IMPLEMENTATION GUIDES: 
10. GUIDE TO THE PSA VIOLENT OFFENSE LIST 1 (2018), 
https://www.psapretrial.org/implementation/guides/measuring-risk/guide-to-the-psa-violent-
offense-list (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
08 - Koepke & Robinson (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 12/28/2018  4:27 PM 
1804 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1725 
 
deciding which of its local charges fall within the Foundation’s 
definition of violence. As the Foundation’s implementation guidance 
explains: 
[A]n offense is categorized as violent if a person causes or 
attempts to cause physical injury through use of force or 
violence against another person. To ensure fidelity to the PSA 
and consistency with its underlying research, a jurisdiction must 
use this definition when creating its PSA Violent Offense List. 
You may not use a different definition based on law or policy.333 
Based on our conversations with practitioners and policymakers, we 
believe that some are confused about this process, and incorrectly 
believe that they can decide what violence will mean in their 
jurisdictions’ score reports. (For example, they may wrongly believe that 
by adding drug crimes to their local Violent Offense List, they can 
consider the PSA’s violence flag to be a statistically valid tool for 
predicting drug crimes as well as other crimes of violence.) In fact, the 
PSA’s statistical model is not modified locally, and any jurisdiction that 
deviates from Arnold’s definition of violence is to create a statistically 
incoherent situation. They would be feeding the tool information it does 
not expect, and preventing the tool from functioning as expected and 
verified in validation studies. At a minimum these definitions must be 
public. Clear definitions of exactly what an outcome measure means, and 
for what relevant time period, are bare minimum requirements. 
The precise period of time over which rearrest and FTA are being 
predicted is a similarly confusing area that would likewise benefit from 
clear public disclosure. It would be easy for a layperson to conclude, 
incorrectly, that today’s tools predict the likelihood of a defendant’s 
rearrest or FTA during that defendant’s particular pretrial period. But in 
order to make predictions over such individual time horizons, an 
instrument would need to incorporate some conjecture about how long 
this particular case will take to resolve, and none do so today. Instead, 
each of today’s tools predicts rearrest and FTA over a fixed time 
period—such as, for example, two years. If a defendant’s period of 
pretrial release is half as long as an instrument’s time horizon, then the 
defendant will be less likely to be rearrested than the tool predicts. Thus, 
it is essential that each tool disclose and publicize the number of days 
over which it predicts rearrest or failure to appear. 
Similarly, the underlying data upon which the model was originally 
developed must be made public in some way. As mentioned in 
                                                     
333. Id.   
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section IV.B.3, aggregate-level reporting of the development sample or 
training data for any pretrial risk assessment tool is necessary. Such a 
report should at least disclose the breakdown of rearrests by charge, 
severity of charge, age, race, and gender. Disclosure of such data can 
help ensure that the model was not overly dependent on charges that are 
especially racially biased, like drug possession. 
Overall, in order for bail reform to be best positioned to succeed, the 
public needs a chance to find the kinds of risks we have described 
elsewhere in this paper. Claims of trade secrecy or confidentiality 
immunize pretrial risk assessment tools from meaningful public 
inspection, including from judges. 
3. Community Oversight of the Tools and Frameworks Is Essential 
As we argued in section III.C, the role of decision-making 
frameworks in bail reform is sorely underexamined. Substantial attention 
and scholarship is directed to the pretrial risk assessment tool. But the 
goal of pretrial risk assessment tools is limited: to classify risk. Yes, that 
classification is important in and of itself. But what judges do with that 
information matters. Ideally, more scholarship and experimentation will 
lead to a more robust debate regarding the role and importance of 
decision-making frameworks. 
Given the right conditions and sets of policies, decision-making 
frameworks could operate as a strong force for decarceration. For 
example, decision-making frameworks that presumptively favor release 
on recognizance, or the fewest, least restrictive conditions of release, for 
the vast majority of defendants would significantly mitigate the concerns 
we advance here—that systematically overestimating risk will, in turn, 
subject a substantial number of defendants to counterproductive 
conditions of release. 
Of course, most decision-making frameworks are advisory. Though a 
decision-making framework advises a judge as to what conditions of 
release—or non-release—are recommended for a given defendant’s 
level of risk, a judge is largely free to assign what conditions of release 
they wish. In fact, maintaining this level of judicial discretion is seen as 
an important political bargain. 
But maintaining judicial discretion does not necessarily vitiate the 
need for community oversight. Ideally, a decision-making framework is 
the product of vibrant community input and debate, from advocates, 
former defendants, public defendants, district attorneys, the judiciary, 
policymakers, and more. At its best, the document should formalize the 
answer to the question: “How much risk will our community tolerate?” 
Understood this way, a decision-making framework would provide any 
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judge a strong signal as to what the community would like done with 
defendants of various risk levels. Accordingly, it should be the norm, not 
the exception, that judges concur with the recommendations of a 
decision-making framework. 
One way to increase concurrence rates is to make the decision-making 
framework presumptive, not advisory, in releasing certain classes of 
defendants, establishing heightened evidentiary and procedural burdens 
for upward departures (that is, for steps that increase incarceration or the 
intensity of supervision). For example, jurisdictions might require judges 
to explain their decision when they diverge from the decision-making 
frameworks’ recommendations. When judges do disagree with the 
recommendations of a decision-making framework—which would not 
be infrequent, even in a perfect world—a couple of steps could be 
required. First, a system could immediately capture the fact that the 
judge diverged from the recommended course of action.334 Second, the 
judge could have to explain in writing why they diverged from the 
decision-making framework’s recommendation. Ideally, this explanation 
should be released in machine-readable format. 
Under such a system, jurisdictions could plausibly be better 
positioned to not only ensure that judges follow the recommendations of 
a decision-making framework, but also be better positioned to lock-in 
decarceral results. Such a system would offer valuable data to 
policymakers and researchers, like: how often judges diverge from the 
recommendations, for what types of defendants they diverge, and why 
they diverge. The histories of bail reform, recited above, and of 
sentencing reform offer current bail reformers a useful cautionary tale 
for limiting judicial discretion through technocratic solutions.335 
CONCLUSION 
Pretrial risk assessment instruments, as they are currently used, 
cannot safely be assumed to advance reformist goals of reducing 
incarceration and enhancing the bail system’s fairness. Early evidence 
                                                     
334. Ideally, this would be linked to the defendant’s file at hand—that way policymakers and 
researchers could analyze why judges deviate from the recommended course of action. 
335. Note, supra note 291, at 1138 (“The history of sentencing reform warns that technocratic 
criminal justice reform can be vulnerable on nearly all fronts. Powerful system actors can hijack 
tools of reform toward their own economic, structural, and racial ends. In the face of political 
pressure and media attention, the same legislature that passes reform can waver in its commitment 
to evidence-based practices and undermine the project. And without buy-in, aligned incentives, and 
limits on discretion, prosecutors and judges can manipulate technocratic reform. Technocratic tools 
can be useful, but they cannot answer tough normative questions at the heart of criminal justice.”). 
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remains sparse, and risk assessment instruments may yet prove 
themselves effective tools in the arsenal of bail reform. But they have 
not done so to date. Shifting to risk assessment-based bail will not 
necessarily reduce incarceration. Without stronger policies, data 
practices, and open governance, we believe it is likely that these tools 
will perpetuate or worsen the very problems reform advocates hope to 
solve. 
Stakeholders who are eager to reduce pretrial incarceration and 
improve the system’s fairness and racial equity may wish to renew their 
energies on policies whose benefits are clearer, such as automatically 
releasing broad categories of misdemeanor defendants. Where risk 
assessments remain in use, their design and governance must be 
improved. 
If history is any guide, the most significant impacts of today’s bail 
reforms may turn out not to be the ones that reformers intend. By 
updating their models with recent, post-reform data, continuously 
monitoring outcomes, measuring the indicators that truly matter, opening 
tools to public scrutiny, and ensuring that risk assessments and 
frameworks never recommend detention, today’s reformers can at least 
minimize their own risk of frustration in the vitally important work that 
they pursue. 
 
